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Introduction 
 
Institutions are supposed to secure society and support solidarity. Through firm institutions, we 
keep our trust in each other, keep injustices at bay, and maintain order. If institutions become 
corrupted, public distrust may breed and weaken solidarity, which can result in social unrest, 
and may grow into worse – in fact, it may even contribute to radicalization or terrorism.1 The 
effects may be equally severe if the public thinks institutions have corrupted, while they really 
did not. This prompts several questions. What makes an institution corrupt? How can we 
correctly judge institutional functioning? Can actions of individuals be legal, socially expected, 
or even morally right, yet, taken together, lead to institutional corruption? Institutional 
corruption is an elusive phenomenon because it is hard to pinpoint wherein the corruptive 
element of an institutionalized practice lies. Meanwhile, the loss of public trust in institutions 
may not only be severe, but institutional corruption is a pressing problem for many societies 
nowadays. My claim is that research on institutional corruption lacks the moral foundation to 
articulate what institutional corruption is and to determine its scope properly. My research 
question is: what is the moral foundation of institutional corruption? A conception of 
institutional corruption that has a proper moral foundation enhances our understanding of 
institutional corruption, broadens and determines its scope, and offers practical ways of judging 
institutional functioning.  
In the first chapter, I ask what institutional corruption means according to leading 
corruption theories. Traditional conceptions of corruption prove too narrow for the distinct 
phenomenon of institutional corruption. Dennis Thompson already observed this problem and, 
therefore, formulated a conception of ‘institutional corruption’.2 The Edmond J. Safra Lab of 
Harvard University (‘the Lab’) elaborated on Thompson’s conception. Unfortunately, the Lab’s 
conception of institutional corruption cannot satisfactorily tell what institutional corruption is. 
Research on institutional corruption is mistaken about what is corruptive about institutional 
corruption and does not properly consider what is institutional about institutional corruption.  
In the second chapter, I ask what is institutional about institutional corruption? To 
pinpoint the corruptive element of institutional corruption, a clear conception of an institution 
is necessary. I therefore explain what an institution is according to institutional theory and how 
modernising developments draw attention to institutional corruption. By doing so, I can 
                                                 
1 Zijderveld 2000, 168-169; Inglehart and Norris 2016. 
2 Thompson 1995. 
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differentiate between different kinds of institutional legitimacies, by which I can present a 
preliminary indication of institutional functioning from a moral perspective. 
In the third chapter, I work out moral institutional functioning by asking what is 
corruptive about institutional corruption and how can we tell? I formulate the moral foundation 
of institutional functioning in a Kantian and Habermassian tradition. Within these traditions, I 
review common ways of judging institutional functioning from a moral perspective. This 
review points to a more adequate way of judging institutional corruption. Lastly, I draw some 
important implications.  
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1. What is institutional corruption? 
 
§ 1.1 Introduction  
Let us start by taking a hypothetical case that we will use for the rest of this research. Everyone 
can be a reporter nowadays. From all corners of society, professionals and amateurs alike gather 
and publish news by using media such as the Internet. For a well-functioning society, citizens 
find news reporting a necessary practice and expect it to be objective and truthful. For instance, 
we expect reporters to report truthfully about politics. Nevertheless, it turns out that the overall 
practice of news reporting (an institution) results into a biased picture of politics, even though 
no individual reporter intended that. For instance, individual reporters neutrally and objectively 
report instances in which a politician does something wrong or inappropriate. The individual 
reports may be truthful, legal, socially expected, and their production perhaps even morally 
right. The general practice, however, can also mislead us to think that politicians should be 
inscrutable, though they are not. Suppose, that in this hypothetical case, all individual actions 
of reporters are legal, socially expected, and even morally right, is the general institution of 
biased news reporting then corrupt?  
Extensive research tells us that corruption damages society considerably and throughout 
all sectors.3 While corruption may never disappear entirely, limiting its injuries benefits us 
socially, economically, physically, and, more general, our well-being. When an illness is 
diagnosed, the medicine must fit the patient. Similarly, a proper conception helps us to identify 
and to fight institutional corruption. However, institutional corruption is different from 
traditional corruption and has not been properly conceptualized yet. Only since the 1990s a 
combination of scandals, increased scientific attention, globalizing tendencies, the information 
revolution and the end of the Cold War, has surged public awareness of traditional corruption.4 
Nowadays, public attention is growing with no signs of stopping and traditional corruption is 
studied and battled ardently.5 Though traditional corruption theories share the same basic 
features as institutional corruption, the conceptions of traditional corruption are useable to a 
limited extent.6  
                                                 
3 Mauro 2002; Nye 2002; Bardhan 2002; Dimant 2013, 37-38.  
4 O’Byrne 2012, 9-27, 52-54, 217-223; Jain 2001, note 6, 103-104. 
5 See Dimant 2013 for an overview. 
6 Paradoxically, the features of traditional corruption are very controversial. See: Philp 2015. Academics only seem to agree 
on that corruption is a moral issue.  
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I will first discuss traditional corruption to show what makes institutional corruption a 
distinct kind of corruption. I will also outline different conceptions and difficulties concerning 
institutional corruption. The leading question in this chapter is: what is institutional corruption? 
 
§ 1.2 Traditional corruption 
Regarding traditional corruption, Jain observes that “there is consensus that corruption refers 
to acts in which the power of public office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes 
the rules of the game.”7 This conception is almost entirely derived from political corruption 
theory.8 Political corruption has been a subject of research since ancient times and deals with 
corruption in the political realm on the levels of individuals, ‘system or institutional decay’, and 
everything in between. In current conceptions of traditional corruption, the most common 
distinction is between ‘grand’ and ‘petty’ corruption.9 Petty corruption is corruption at a low 
level as a direct action by individual state administrators, such as bribery or embezzlement. 
Grand corruption is corruption at a higher political level, at which politicians and administrators 
exercise improper influences, for example through legislation in the advantage of private 
companies. 
An analysis reveals what makes this traditional conception too narrow for institutional 
corruption.10 First, it approaches corruption on the micro-level, that is, on the level of 
individuals.11 Corruption on meso levels (organisations) or macro levels (social 
segments/societal) has received far less attention. Any thoughts on corruption of institutions are 
generally formed by extension of individual corruption. Secondly, corruption commonly 
pertains to a public office and so excludes the private sector. Our normative senses first turn to 
our government while we tend to disregard the moral responsibility of the private sector. As a 
side effect, we tend to observe corruption on the scale of nation states and thereby neglect the 
possibility that corruption might not limit itself to traditional borders.12 Thirdly, the common 
assumption is that individuals intentionally engage in corruption for personal gain. Corruption 
for benefits other than quid pro quo are hard for us to imagine. Fourthly, although we know 
corruption has something to do with morality, it is mostly identified as a violation of (penal) 
laws or other rules.13 Corruption tends to succumb into a tunnel vision of legal theory that is 
                                                 
7 Jain 2001, 73.  
8 O’Byrne 2012, 171-172; Heidenheimer & Johnston 2002, 6-9, 11, 131. See for an alternative formulation: Philp 2002, 42; 
2015, 22. 
9 Dahlström 2015, 111. 
10 Friedrich 2002, 15; Dimant 2013, 5-6; Kurer 2015. 
11 O’Byrne 2012, 58-59. 
12 Heywood 2015, 5-7. 
13 English 2013, 27; Laver 2014, 17. 
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often combined with a view of humans as rational, economic and self-interested beings.14 The 
government has a social role as the shepherd of a nation’s economy and is, therefore, the default 
player to set things right. Consequently, states employ regulation as an engineering tool to 
coerce rational actors. Most anti-corruption measures were only aimed at traditional corruption 
and proved worryingly ineffective.15  
 
§ 1.3 Institutional corruption  
Thompson coined ‘institutional corruption’ as he observed that increasingly complex 
institutions call for a different idea of corruption.16 Take the example of the news reporting. 
There is no direct individual bribery for instance. From the perspective of traditional corruption, 
the first thing to notice is that institutional corruption does not only touch government 
institutions but concerns the private sector too. Secondly, institutional corruption takes place at 
a more general level than at the individual level. An institution can spread over communities, 
organisations, societal sectors, societies, et cetera. Thirdly, institutional corruption does not 
require quid pro quo exchanges. The reporters have no direct reciprocal relations with anyone 
to motivate their actions. Instead, its wrongfulness is known only by effect, harming society on 
a more general level. Fourthly, the institution in our example is legal. And so, we can infer that 
(1) this corruption does not fit the traditional concept and (2) institutional corruption seems to 
direct to an idea of some moral responsibility towards society. 
Lawrence Lessig continued Thompson’s exploration of institutional corruption.17 The 
foremost concern of Lessig and Thompson was that institutional corruption undermines public 
trust in institutions and harms actual trustworthiness of institutions.18 Public trust in institutions 
is the ground on which societies flourish. The supposition is that institutional corruption reduces 
the authority and legitimacy of the state, political processes, effective accountability, and a 
‘culture of merit’.19 These harms occur if the public views an institution as untrustworthy, even 
if the institution functions as it ought to in reality.20 In addition, once public trust is undermined, 
it is hard to restore it and it may lead to a vicious and contagious cycle of institutional 
corruption.21  
                                                 
14 Scott 1995, 37. 
15 Laver, 2014, 10; O’Byrne 2012, 217. 
16 Thompson 1995, 6-7. 
17 Lessig, Lawrence to interested individuals, memorandum (v.3.0), November 12, 2010, on: http://ethics.harvard.edu/lab. 
18 Thompson 1995, 10.  
19 Laver 2014, 12-13. English 2013, 7; Salter 2013, 67. 
20 This actually does not imply institutional corruption, but institutional dysfunction. I discuss this in section 2.6. 
21 Brock 2014, 46-47; Dincer & Fredriksson 2013, 8-10, 22; Avetisyan & Khachatryan 2014. 
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Lessig sought a broader exploration of institutional corruption. Hence, he launched the 
Lab in 2010, which was subdivided into two projects that continued until May 2015.22 The first 
project should identify institutional corruption, the second should explore its remedies. The 
Lab’s research produced an abundance of cases that illustrate institutional corruption 
throughout and between entire societies. Many different authors have adopted Lessig’s classic 
concept of institutional corruption, but some have also changed or reformulated it. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will discuss and evaluate the most important varieties.  
 
§ 1.4 The Thompson-Lessig model: a purpose benchmark 
Thompson started with the features of a traditional conception of individual political corruption 
to develop institutional corruption. He claims that institutional corruption occurs when the 
institution (‘s agent) receives a functional benefit, for which a procedurally improper service 
is systematically exchanged that distorts institutional purposes (; indicated by the tendency to 
disregard institutional procedures).23 In Republic, Lost, Lessig is often thought to have 
‘matured’ Thompson’s concept. Lessig’s model has become the authoritative model and defines 
institutional corruption as 
1) the consequence of an influence 
2) within an economy of influence that 
3) illegitimately 
4) weakens the effectiveness of an institution 
5) especially by weakening the public trust of the institution.24 
Lessig phrases his model differently from Thompson’s, but the models share similarities. Their 
models are often taken together as the ‘Thompson-Lessig model’.25 Common to both models is 
that: 
o Institutional corruption is the consequence of an exchange of influence. Institutions are 
positioned in an intricate web of influences, some of which pervert an institutional practice 
and undermine the institution’s purpose. This exemplifies institutional corruption’s self-
perpetuating and long-term character.  
                                                 
22 Lessig, Lawrence to interested individuals, memorandum (v.3.0), November 12, 2010, on: http://ethics.harvard.edu/lab. 
23 Thompson 2013, 4-5, 8-9. Thompson offers different versions of his concept. Here, I present what I think is the most 
complete version.  
24 “Institutional Corruption”. Wiki.lessig.org. http://wiki.lessig.org/InstitutionalCorruption. (accessed March 9, 2017). 
25 Newhouse 2013, 556.  
It is a mistake to combine Thompson’s and Lessig’s models, because Thompson clearly disagrees on fundamental points with 
Lessig. See: Thompson 2013, 5. 
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o The source of institutional corruption is an improper (illegitimate) influence that 
undermines the institution’s purposes. Corruption means perversion by an ‘external’ 
influence that ought not to be. While news reporting is socially expected, the harmful 
influence of (for instance) misleading portrayal is not. The institution of news reporting is 
harmfully influenced by the misleading tendencies and the institution of news reporting 
has possibly corrupted. 
o Institutional corruption becomes visible in a consequentialist way, that is, as a weakened 
effectiveness of the institution to reach its purposes.26 However, it is possible that all 
procedures are followed properly but that institutional purposes are still undermined. Even 
if reporters use proper and valid informational resources, they can still produce a 
misleading image. For this reason, Lessig differs from Thompson and does not require that 
institutional procedures are improper. Lessig instead suggests ‘purposiveness’ as a 
benchmark, that is, the institution has corrupted when it deviates from its purpose.  
o Finally, and most importantly, institutional corruption’s most harmful injury is the social 
injury: the loss of public trust in the institution. The social injury is distinguished from 
institutional injury, which means that the institutional functioning itself is corrupted.27  
 
The differences between traditional corruption and institutional corruption are significant. 
Firstly, institutional corruption means that institutions rather than individuals have corrupted.28 
Institutional corruption takes place on an institutional level rather than on the individual level. 
Secondly, the exchange mechanism of institutional corruption takes the form of an indirect 
tendency, i.e., an ‘economy of influence’ that tends to perpetuate itself.29 Institutions are 
continuously influenced by many relations and effects in society, and vice versa. By contrast, 
traditional (grand) corruption implies incidental actions of individual politicians who aim for a 
straightforward quid pro quo exchange.30 Traditional corruption is therefore characterised by 
an individual intention, whereas institutional corruption is characterised by a general tendency. 
The difference between institutional and individual levels also changes the nature of received 
benefits. Benefits for individuals are often instantaneously gained and more easily identifiable, 
whereas institutional advantages are indirect, gradual, and harder to identify. Thirdly, an 
                                                 
26 Lessig 2013(a), 553-554. 
27 Salter 2010, 4. 
28 Oliveira 2014, 15; Light 2013, 11: “Rogue individual behaviors, such as lone traders who gamble and lose millions for their 
firms, are not forms institutional corruption. Behaviors must be institutionally sanctioned or at least tolerated.” 
29 Mendonca 2013, 6. 
30 Kurer 2015, 32-34. 
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institution may have corrupted while individuals may act morally right on an individual level.31 
Fourthly, institutional practices can be legal and are (initially) often even expected to be legal. 
By contrast, traditional corruption is often identified as a violation of regulation. Fifthly and 
lastly, the moral consequences are different. The main harm of traditional corruption is the 
undermining of personal integrity. Its social injury is only secondary and viewed by extension 
of the primary injury. Contrarily, institutional corruption’s primary injury is social as it harms 
public trust in institutions and consequently harms society. Injury of personal integrity is only 
secondary, if it occurs at all. These features and differences are presented in the following 
overview.32 
 
Scheme 1. Traditional and institutional corruption 
Traditional corruption 
Institutional corruption 
(Thompson-Lessig model) 
Quid pro quo exchange of improper public service 
(individual intention) 
Economy of influences in self-perpetuation 
(institutional tendency) 
Personal benefit for individual(s) Institutional advantage 
(Often) illegal (Often) legal 
(Often) public sector (Often) public sector 
Individual’s integrity is harmed 
(a) Weakens public trust 
(b) Institutional practice is illegitimate 
(c) Weakens institutional effectiveness to reach 
(d) A purpose 
 
Finally, a second important contribution of Lessig should be mentioned. Lessig uncovered 
‘dependence corruption’, which is common to institutional corruption, but not characteristic. 
Dependence corruption occurs when an institution becomes dependent on some external source 
of influence in an improper way.33 For instance, U.S. Congress members are chosen by the U.S. 
people, but they must be funded too. Consequently, they serve the people’s interest and the 
                                                 
31 For instance, individuals are sometimes forced to bribery, which is not morally wrong as a forced, individual act. Nonetheless, 
this can create institutional corruption on a more general level.  
32 See also: Mendonca 2013, 4-6. 
33 Lessig distinguishes substantive distortion from agenda distortion. Agenda distortion distorts the selection process about 
which matters will be discussed. Substantive distortion distorts the matter itself. Lessig 2011, 160. 
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special interests of funders. The representatives’ dependence on the people is considered proper, 
because it was so intended by the Founding Fathers. However, their dependence on funders 
distracts representatives from their proper purpose (representation) and, therefore, the source of 
this dependency relation is wrong.34 According to Lessig, the source of the relation of 
dependence legitimates the relation itself. 
 
§ 1.5 The private-sector and the purpose problem  
Thompson and Lessig seek an ‘institution-agnostic’ model, a model that can be applied to 
multiple institutions, which may include the private sector.35 Indeed, many Lab-authors support 
this view. Since traditional corruption focusses on public officials or institutions, the inclusion 
of the private sector would be a significant change.36 The dominant view is that the private 
sector is hardly, if at all, bound by a moral responsibility to the public beyond legal 
responsibility. In contrast, the public sector is strongly bound to public interest. The argument 
is that the private individuals form their private, subjective conception of the good and can 
pursue their interests within the law. Applying institutional corruption to the private sector 
requires substantial reframing of the concept, notes Oliveira.37 For the purpose of this research, 
this issue is called the ‘private-sector problem’. 
The Thompson-Lessig model has a second major issue. Lessig suggests that the 
institutional purposes are the proper benchmark to identify institutional corruption. Initially, 
institutional purposes can be applied to the private sector too. However, Lessig’s purpose-based 
approach has a shortcoming which Taylor calls the problem of ‘teleological indeterminacy’.38 
Because that is too much of a mouthful, I will call it the ‘purpose problem’.39 In essence, the 
purpose problem means that externally determined purposes lack the grip for determining 
institutional corruption. The purpose problem is a concern for every purpose-based conception 
of institutional corruption, regardless of whether an institution is private or public. The problem 
is broken down into four sub-problems: 
                                                 
34 Lessig 2013(b), 13-16; 2011, 15-20, 160.  
35 Lessig 2013(a), 554. 
36 See: Huntington 2002, 254-255 and Sandoval-Ballesteros 2013, 29, on private-public distinction in traditional-corruption 
theory.  
37 Oliveira 2014, 5. 
38 Taylor 2014, 5-7.  
The problem of teleological indeterminacy goes for dependence corruption too, given that we can simply substitute ‘purpose’ 
for ‘source of dependency’. 
39 Institutional purposes and similar kinds are commonly used benchmarks. See for instance: Miller 2010, 37-46; Colin 2002, 
63-64; Philp 2015, 23.  
The purpose problem largely applies to benchmarks such as public interest, public opinion or legal accounts (See: Philp 2002, 
46-47). The reason for this should become clear with the third chapter. 
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1. The problem of confused purpose is the most straightforward problem. For many 
institutions – especially in the private sector – it is highly disputable which purpose an 
institution (should) serve(s). Should a government merely protect classic liberal rights and 
public order, or should it actively increase the public’s welfare? Should the reporters 
redress the practice, and if so, for which purposes? Does the government have a (moral) 
responsibility in such issues? Zijderveld observes that substantial institutional values, 
goals, and missions have eroded due to modernising developments.40 
2. The problem of conflicting purpose is similar. Sometimes, institutions, such as news 
reporting, are assigned multiple purposes. Reporters intend to be objective and truthful to 
the public, but some may think that, above all, reporting serves to make a profit. Do these 
purposes clash?41 Which purpose should be chosen in practice? By which purpose can we 
determine whether a practice is corrupt?42  
3. The problem of changed purpose means that an institution that changed its practices could 
be labelled either corrupt or developed. Suppose reporting was once thought of as 
publication of merely ‘dry’ information, but reporting is now expected to help form a 
quality public judgement too. What makes this change a positive development or 
institutional corruption? 
4. Lastly, the problem of confounded purpose entails that institutional corruption cannot 
occur if practices are wrong by mistake or misjudgement, as institutional dysfunction is no 
corruption. Yet, it seems not thought through what dysfunction on the institutional level 
means for the moral dimension.43 I will address this in the next chapter. 
The purpose problem shows that institutional purposes cannot provide the needed moral 
foundation by itself.44 Institutional purposes would still need to be justified before they can 
properly serve as a benchmark. 
 
§ 1.6 Fiduciary theory 
Michael Pierce and Marie E. Newhouse present an impressive answer to the private-sector and 
the purpose problems within a principal-agent framework.45 Newhouse claims the Thompson-
Lessig model should be interpreted as a fiduciary theory. She says that state institutions must 
keep to a public purpose because they are entrusted with the monopoly on coercion in society. 
                                                 
40 See also: Zijderveld 2000, 95-97. 
41 See for clear examples of conflicting purposes: Rodwin 2013; Rodwin 2015; Fox 2013. 
42 Oliveira expands on this problem, in: Oliveira 2014.  
43 An issue already mentioned by Doty & Kouchaki, in: Doty & Kouchaki 2015, 11. 
44 Compare with: Habermas 1995, 114-115, on values. Habermas’ critique holds for institution purposes as well. 
45 Pierce 2013; Newhouse 2013. 
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The public’s trust in the state to use power creates an ‘obligatory purpose’, that is, “the purpose 
for which the institution’s activities must be conducted in order to avoid wronging others.”46 
The state’s purposes are set, made obligatory, and checked democratically by the public. 
Newhouse argues that the state is a fiduciary and the public is its principal. In legal theory, 
fiduciaries are organisations or individuals that must act only in the interests of their principal, 
because the principal entrusts his fiduciary agent with his critical resources. Hence, Newhouse 
can identify institutional corruption by (a) the existence of a (fiduciary) trust relation between 
the public and a public institution, (b) the existence of an obligatory purpose for power exercise 
by an institution, and (c) the breach of public trust by an institution’s failure to keep to its 
obligatory purpose. For the public sector, it is clear how this interpretation can identify 
institutional corruption. 
This is, however, different for the private sector. Newhouse claims that because “private 
organizations usually do not coerce us, they are not generally obligated to act for the state’s 
public purpose. Moreover, it is not obvious that all private organizations have an obligatory 
purpose of any sort.”47 The public has not entrusted the private sector with any democratic 
power and has, therefore, no obligatory purposes. Hence, the dominant view is that it can 
determine its own purposes, change them, and even choose to serve special interests only. My 
reasons for disagreement with Newhouse as well as other difficulties following from this 
chapter’s outline, are discussed throughout the next chapters. 
However, Newhouse makes one exception. She distinguishes the private institutions into 
fiduciaries, frauds, fiends and fools.48 The elements of fiduciary theory were explained above. 
Newhouse illustrates her point with the amusing example of pie business ‘Patti’s Piping Pies’. 
Basically, Newhouse says that if I trust Patti’s Piping Pies with my money to invest in the pie 
business, then Patti’s is the fiduciary agent and I am the principal. When investing my money, 
Patti’s must strictly serve my interests. If Patti’s, however, lacks business sense and makes 
investment mistakes, then Patti’s is a fool. If Patti’s deceives me or treats me disingenuously, 
regardless of whether I entrusted her with my money, then Patti’s is a fraud. Patti’s could sell 
me rotten pies for instance. If Patti’s wrongs the public as a side effect, then Patti’s is a fiend. 
For instance, Patti’s could invest my money into toxic baking-chemicals that incidentally harm 
public health. All in all, Newhouse claims that (1) the Thompson-Lessig model is best explained 
as a fiduciary theory, (2) public institutions have a fiduciary relation with the public, and (3) 
                                                 
46 Newhouse 2013, 562; Pierce 2013, 10. 
47 Newhouse 2013, 555, 557. 
48 Newhouse 2013, 570-578. 
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only those private institutions that stand in a fiduciary contract or status have an obligatory 
purpose and are susceptible to institutional corruption.49 
 
§ 1.7 Difficulties of fiduciary theory 
Fiduciary theory has many advantages. It fits Western liberal tradition and social contract theory 
well.50 Social contract theory in Western philosophy is a clear way for explaining (moral) 
obligations and responsibility, even if it is counterfactual. In line with liberal tradition, contract 
parties are free to decide on whatever the contract agrees upon. In addition, in an increasingly 
legalizing society, fiduciary theory is appealing.51 Secondly, fiduciary theory’s account of 
normativity might be easier to accept by using obligatory purposes compared to Lessig’s 
institutional-purpose approach. Normativity girded by a sense of contract obligation and 
reciprocity might find more appeal. Thirdly, Newhouse’s and Pierce’s fiduciary theory narrows 
down the purpose problem. A principal can exactly specify for a fiduciary agent which purposes 
are right and how these should be pursued lest institutional corruption occurs. 
Unfortunately, fiduciary theory falls short to the challenges posed. First, the fiduciary 
relation between principal and his fiduciary agent is impractical. A fiduciary agent may need 
deliberation with his principal when circumstances require nuances or changes. The fiduciary 
relation with pre-established purposes tends to force the fiduciary agent to account for their 
actions beforehand. It limits the fiduciary agent’s possibilities to respond to unexpected 
circumstances and can make his frame of action too static. Alternatively, if the fiduciary agent 
is delegated to act (more) freely and the fiduciary agent is held less strictly answerable to his 
principal, we may then wonder what sense a fiduciary relation has at all. Accountability is a 
central element to fiduciary theory.  
Insofar the fiduciary agent is still held answerable by his principal, the purpose problem 
comes into play. Oliveira explains this by arguing that purposes require an interpretation and a 
break-down into smaller goals to be practical.52 This opens the room for disagreement and 
confusion over the right interpretation of goals once again. When we apply Oliveira’s point to 
fiduciary theory, the purpose problem repeats on each level of practical application. Because 
the fiduciary theory stresses the accountability of the fiduciary in relation to his principal, the 
consequences of the purpose problem become weightier. The principal can claim at any time 
                                                 
49 Newhouse 2013, 570, 581-585, 591. 
50 Doty & Kouchaki 2015, 7-8. 
51 Pierce 2013, 11. 
52 Oliveira 2014, 13. Doty & Kouchaki present a similar argument in Doty & Kouchaki 2015, 21. For a disagreeing view, see: 
Kurer 2015, 31-32. 
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that the fiduciary does not act according to the principal’s stated purposes and that the fiduciary 
is accountable for institutional corruption, which can create uncertainty for the fiduciary agent 
and makes institutional corruption an easily applicable label, along with all its harms. 
Newhouse’s interpretation is therefore impractical.  
Furthermore, Newhouse and Pierce suggest that ‘wronging others’ only happens in a 
significant way if an unambiguously given trust is betrayed. They suggest that only a 
democratically or legally established relation of trust creates an unambiguous responsibility of 
the fiduciary to his principal.53 Newhouse borrows normativity from legal fiduciary theory to 
fill the moral foundation of institutional purposes.54 The scope of institutional corruption, 
however, is much broader. Here, the problem is that the moral nature of institutional corruption 
becomes too restrained to the characteristics of the legal dimension.55 Let us take our example 
case. It can be argued that news reporters are the fiduciary agents to their principals: reporters 
serve the public by reporting and informing in the public sphere. Their reports are generally 
neutral and objective. Taken together, however, they unintentionally paint a misleading picture 
of politicians as a side-effect. The public is aware that the news institution creates a misguiding 
picture. Consequently, politicians are misleadingly portrayed and the public loses trust in the 
reporting institutions. In this case, reporters individually fulfil their obligatory purposes and 
keep the fiduciary relation with the public intact – and the institution even observes the law. 
Nevertheless, we call this practice institutionally corrupt because it unjustly harms politicians 
and undermines the public trust in reporting institutions – and possibly politics too.56 This 
shows that a fiduciary relation cannot tell us how to judge institutional functioning. 
Newhouse may argue that the example involves a (non-government) private party and the 
institutional corruption cannot occur as it has no external obligatory purposes “[b]ecause a non-
fiduciary commercial actor is not obligated to act for the purposes of any other person or 
organization, its institutional purpose is not externally determined. Instead, an institution's 
subjective purposes, however they are understood and ascertained, must guide the analysis. […] 
The Frauds and Fie[n]ds are said to be corrupt, not because they deviate from some obligatory 
purpose, but because some of their subjective purposes […] are unjust.”57  
Fiduciary theory excludes many private institutional practices that institutional corruption 
is supposed to address: the frauds, fiends, and possibly even fools. Here, we suppose that their 
                                                 
53 Newhouse 2013, 588, 593.  
54 Pierce 2013, 6; Oliveira 2014, 10; O’Brien 2013, 26. 
55 Pierce 2013, 12, 15. 
56 See for a financial sector example: Salter 2010; Salter 2013. 
57 Newhouse 2013, 585. Of course, this might hold for any private party, not only commercial parties. 
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institutionalized practices can affect society and undermine public trust at the same time. The 
many cases gathered in the Lab’s Working Papers and blogs suggest correctly that the private 
sector can be prone to institutional corruption too. Fiduciary theory does not solve the private-
sector problem and is not the adequate way to judge institutional functioning. External 
obligatory purposes are not the right benchmark. Fiduciary theory falls short of the task at hand. 
 
§ 1.8 Starting from the wrong end 
The purpose problem brings a crucial question to the surface: are institutional purposes the right 
benchmark for institutional corruption to begin with? First, we should observe that all theories 
based on institutional purposes suffer from the same mistake.58 What characterises the attempts 
to benchmark institutional corruption has been formulated by Light: “the concept of corruption 
is normative and one cannot define it without a moral basis outside the concept. Adding a moral 
foundation would also help define and defend concepts of institutional integrity as the basis for 
reform.”59 Most authors add a moral benchmark to institutional corruption. Oliveira observes 
that the institutional purpose is being justified by a rationalisation from outside.60 The problem 
is that many different purposes can be justified by many different rationalisations – all for the 
same institution. None of the purposes are definitely justified, but all remain contentious. 
Effectively, Taylor notes, all we do is evaluate whether a practice is the most effective way to 
reach a purpose – not whether that purpose is just as we evaluate the institution’s functionality.61  
Taylor does not present an alternative, but adopts institutional functionality. He claims 
that fiduciary theory cannot escape the purpose problem. Instead, he suggests that a deviation 
from an institution’s function constitutes institutional corruption. Functionalism is characterised 
by having “the capacities or properties that enable an object to participate in a wider system of 
objects and relations. So the function of a unit of selection in evolutionary theory.”62 Thus, 
functionalism in the social environment of an institution entails that “[…] the existence and 
persistence of the practices depends on how well the practices perform their social functions.” 
An institutional function is assigned to an institution by society and because of its functional 
merits for society. If an institution is not useful to society, then the institution is corrupt, 
according to Taylor. Observed by Oliveira again, the difference with Lessig’s approach is 
                                                 
58 There are other slightly adapted versions of the purpose approach. For example: Brock 2014, 5-6; Youngdahl 2013, 37-44; 
Marks 2013, 23. However, these theories remain institutional-purpose approaches in essence. A somewhat better developed 
version is that of Doty & Kouchaki 2015. However, their theory of ‘commitment drift’ still presents a moderated version of 
fiduciary theory, and so presents another institutional-purpose approach. 
59 Light 2013, 18.  
60 Oliveira 2014, 7. 
61 Taylor 2014, 12-16. 
62 Taylor uses a primarily evolutionary version of functionalism. See: Taylor 2014, 12. 
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fundamental.63 Lessig’s approach prompts us to assign the purpose to an institution from an 
external standpoint first, after which we must create a justification. This method of justification 
invites the purpose problem. Taylor firstly examines the institution’s position and practice 
within society – he searches its reason for existence – and then derives the institutional function 
from that. Compared to Lessig, Taylor works the other way around: he justifies an institutional 
function by its actual practices and thus does not need justification afterwards.  
Taylor’s functionalism can be interpreted in two ways. An institutional function may be 
determined on grounds of what the institution actually does. For example, if reporters factually 
aim to inform the public, ‘neutral informing’ can become its institutional function. The 
institutional function is then equated to the institution’s actual practices. But where is the 
benchmark if it is the same as its actual function? How can we tell whether its function or 
practice is any good, if the reporting practice actually does what it should be doing? Neutral 
reporting then cannot be evaluated on institutional corruption. Should we therefore look for 
ways the reporters ought to function?  
The alternative suggests that we look at the way news reporting should function from the 
social perspective of society in which it is already functioning. We can observe the reporters’ 
ambition to inform the public and evaluate whether they should be aspiring to that. Naturally, 
we must then ask ourselves what function reporting should have in perspective of the way it 
functions now. Once again, the purpose problem enters. 
 Taylor’s functionalism fails to provide us with a normative benchmark. Both 
functionalism and the institutional-purpose approach allow for morally wrong purposes without 
concluding institutional corruption. Suppose that reporters publish for the purpose of promoting 
an oppressive dictator instead of a democratic rule. Their effectively and efficiently reporting 
hits its purposes, and so we could argue, according to Taylor and Newhouse, that the institution 
is not corrupt. Nevertheless, the institutional purpose of reporting may be wrong by itself for 
striving to support dictatorial oppression, with the result that the public loses trust in the 
reporting institution itself. 
Both theories also allow morally wrong practices without concluding institutional 
corruption. For instance, the reporting institution has the institutional purpose of making profits, 
which is arguably not a corrupt purpose by itself. However, it turns out that the most profitable 
reports dramatically picture politicians as untrustworthy. According to Newhouse and Taylor, 
this is not institutionally corrupt as long as reporters effectively and efficiently hit their 
                                                 
63 Oliveira 2014, 7.  
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institutional purposes and/or manage to function within the societal system. Nevertheless, the 
reporting institution may be functioning unjust and could undermine public trust in the 
institution of reporting itself. The institution might in reality therefore be corrupted itself.  
The institutional-purpose approach only tells us whether a purpose is reached, but not if 
a purpose or practice functions in a just manner and deserve public trust, as functionalism only 
tells us whether an institution can abide by society’s actual demands. Functionalism and an 
institutional-purpose approach are both grounded in a functional or instrumental rationality 
insofar it looks to whether institutional purposes have been met or whether institutions can 
function within the system.64 We need another approach to determine a moral appropriateness 
of institutional functioning and public trust. 
 
§ 1.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reviewed the conception of traditional corruption and the Lab’s accounts of 
institutional corruption. The purpose problem and the private-sector problem are the two main 
difficulties, none of which are solved by the leading accounts of institutional corruption. What 
still misses, is how to determine whether an institution is just. Compared with symptoms that 
occur when one has a disease, Lessig’s institutional purpose approach, a practice that deviates 
from an institutional purpose (or a function), is, at most, a symptom of the disease. In this way, 
however, it is a symptom that does not necessarily occur with the disease, nor is it a symptom 
that is the basis for a definite diagnosis of the disease. Institutional purposes and functionalism 
mistakenly identify a symptom with the disease itself. The institutional-purpose approach is not 
the proper method for moral evaluation. I agree with Oliveira and Taylor that Lessig starts from 
the ‘wrong end’, that is, Lessig’s approach prompts us to claim an institutional purpose first 
and then justify it afterwards.65 I propose to work the other way around by starting with concrete 
situations, like Taylor seems to suggest. However, while Taylor’s account starts out right, his 
approach lacks the needed moral evaluation to judge institutional corruption.  
My hypothesis is that institutional corruption needs a moral foundation. A proper moral 
foundation enables us to properly judge the institutions’ functioning from a moral perspective. 
However, I also think current accounts lack understanding of what an institution is. Without a 
clear conception of it and what it ought to do, we cannot properly understand how to judge 
institutional functioning from a moral perspective adequately. Therefore, the next step is to 
expand more on what makes institutional corruption ‘institutional’, which will be the topic of 
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the next chapter. I will combine institutional theory with forming a proper moral judgement 
about institutional functioning. I claim that this will lead to a valid and practical method to 
judge institutional functioning from a moral perspective. This will be discussed in more detail 
in the third chapter.  
18 
 
2. What is institutional about institutional corruption? 
 
§ 2.1 Introduction  
In the first chapter, I explained what the Lab understands by institutional corruption. I 
concluded that the central flaw of the Lab’s research is that it lacks a moral foundation. 
Institutional corruption mainly distinguishes itself from traditional corruption in that it is 
‘institutional’. The Lab, however, seems to be confused on the meaning of ‘institution’.66 The 
term is used interchangeably for organisations, societal sectors, and practices. It is odd that the 
Lab sheds little light on institutional theory. Without a clear conception of institutions, the moral 
foundation is difficult to pin down. Institutional corruption then risks becoming an all-purpose 
word and its potential significance is jeopardized.  
In this chapter, we firstly discuss what an institution is, guided by Richard Scott. 
Secondly, we discuss the development and social importance of modern institutions to our 
societies and, in doing so, outline the reason institutional corruption receives public attention. 
Thirdly, we distinguish institutional legitimacy from justification. Finally, we draw several 
moral distinctions concerning institutional functioning. The central question of this chapter is: 
what is institutional about institutional corruption? In the next chapter, we research what makes 
an institution corrupt. 
 
§ 2.2 What is an institution?  
I start with the definition of an institution according to institutional theory. An accurate picture 
of an ‘institution’ clears up what is institutional about institutional corruption and what sets it 
apart from traditional corruption. Scott offers us a comprehensive and proper description of an 
institution: institutions are “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behaviour.”67 We elaborate on this description for our 
working definition: institutions are stable social structures in the form of routinized behaviour 
(or: practices); institutions produce and reproduce shared meaning; institutions are to some 
degree taken for granted, regulated and/or socially enforced.68 
Firstly, we should be aware that institutions are different from institutes and groups, as 
explained by Zijderveld. Groups, communities and organisations are collectives of individuals, 
                                                 
66 Li et al. address this in: Li et al. 2007. 
67 Scott 1995, 33. 
68 There are different formulations of ‘institution’. See Scott 1995 for an overview of different views on institutional theory. 
See for example: Avetisyan & Khachatryan 2014. 
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whereas institutes are historical instances of institutions.69 However, in practice, these 
theoretical distinctions are often much less clear. For example, reporters can form a group, 
community or organisation that is socially engaged to neutrally report news. They are (or form 
a collective of) agents. Their practice of reporting is a social structure, a structured behaviour, 
an institution. Newspapers, journalism or professional broadcasting are institutes, as they 
embody the news institutions as historical instances. Many combinations are possible: one 
institution may run through many groups or one group can have many institutions. Likewise, 
an institute may have many different institutions and, conversely, an institution may be 
embodied by many different institutes. Journalism and government both participate in the 
institution of (politically) informing the public. Journalism may be involved in other institutions 
as well, as some journalists for instance are affected by practices like Internet amateur 
journalism or public discredit of journalism by politicians. 
Let us take our example to accompany our working definition. Reporters share a routine 
and general practice of reporting news – an institution. In our example, we assume that society 
expects a proper news reporting practice for society to function. Furthermore, the actual news 
reporting abides by the law. In fact, news reporting is well-established in our society and is 
taken for granted. In this instance, news reporting has institutionalized (the creation and 
maintenance of an institution) as a routine behaviour (practice) by the reporters (group). For 
our example, we will assume that individual reporting is even morally right while the general 
practice is nonetheless unjust.70 
This will now be explained. We make sense of the world with interaction, reflection, and 
the reproduction of meaning, as George Herbert Mead shows.71 Knowledge, behaviours, 
expectations, and such, are incorporated into patterns for our thoughts, feelings, and actions 
(behaviour) and help us understand the world.72 Zijderveld argues that institutions anchor in 
routinized thinking, acting, and feeling, so that we may understand ourselves, others, our social 
world, and the world as a whole. Institutions function to ‘encode’ the world in different codes 
that we understand and use.73 Hence, human action, thought, and feelings (behaviour/practices) 
are only possible and have meaning within a social world. As Mead argues, when we interact 
with others we form identities of our individual selves, others, and groups we belong to.74 We 
                                                 
69 Zijderveld 2000, 35-41.  
70 This requires further moral investigation that stretches beyond this research. It includes the relations between moral 
responsibility, rightness, and blameworthiness, and how they relate between micro and macro levels.  
71 Mead 1934, 89; Zijderveld 2000, 30. 
72 See: Zijderveld 2000, 54-55. 
73 See also: Mead 1934, 97-100, 260. 
74 Mead 1934, 75-77, 138; Zijderveld 2000, 46-47, 53-56; Scott 1995, 13, 21, 24, 40-41.  
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need others to reflect, to form our own identity and the identities of others. We also need 
interaction to be able to take each other’s role.75 This allows us to develop (self-) reflection and 
(social) identity. Habermas says: “Individuals acquire and sustain their identity by 
appropriating traditions, belonging to social groups, and taking part in socializing 
interactions.”76 Our (social) world is formed by institutions, as an understandable, meaningful, 
and socially shared background against which we can live together, i.e., a lifeworld with others 
in a mutual understanding. Mutual understanding can help to further cultivate social stability 
and solidarity on which society is built. 
On the one hand, individuals form and maintain institutions on a micro level; institutions 
would not exist without human individuals. Individuals can create, use, adapt, or abolish 
institutions by adjusting their behaviour;77 after all, we are not mindless zombies. Accordingly, 
institutionalisation often involves individual and social strategies and often requires individuals 
to have social skills to execute strategies and getting things done – to influence others in forming 
institutions.78  
As Lessig says, there is an ‘economy of influences’. Not only are institutions formed in 
individual and social perspectives, but institutions themselves are also always intermeshed with 
other institutions within an environment of institutions.79 For instance, news reporting is also 
involved with practices in politics, local communities, education, or business companies. Such 
interactions between institutions constitute each other and form the social system of society.  
Institutions are ambiguous and elusive, which make their corruption ‘obscene’, as Fields 
notes.80 Because on the other hand, institutions function autonomously from individuals on a 
macro level. This macro level explains how general institutions can corrupt, while individual 
actions can nevertheless be expected, legal, and morally right. The character of institutions has 
a twofold horizon: individual and social. As Scott argues: “Although constructed and 
maintained by individual actors, institutions assume the guise of an impersonal and objective 
reality.”81 Mary Douglas shows that structured behaviour can occur without any individual 
intention or awareness, or that institutions can ‘think for themselves’.82 We often unconsciously 
pick up institutional codes and repetitively use them, like a needle following the patterns on a 
gramophone disc. For instance, the publishing of reporters may be morally right as individual 
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76 Habermas 1990(b), 102. 
77 Mead 1934, 91, 98. 
78 Zijderveld 2000, 37-38.  
79 Luhmann 1995, 210-224; Zijderveld 2000, 120-122. 
80 See: Fields 2013. 
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acts; none of the individual reports by themselves do injustice to others. Taken together, 
however, the individual reports may produce a misleading image of politics that wrongs 
politicians, amongst others. In this case, the reporters individually act morally right, yet the 
institution they produce is unjust. An institution has no agency and cannot be held responsible. 
Nevertheless, a (group of) individual(s) that is (are) somehow involved with the institution can 
be held responsible, because they do have agency. 
For instance, anyone joining reporting practice is likely to pick up on ‘how things are 
done’ without thinking much about it. New reporters observe how colleagues do things and 
unconsciously pick up on that. Institutions are never perfectly repeated, but are with every 
repetition changed and adjusted to new situations and individuals.83 Routinized practices of 
others can be unconsciously picked up by others, so institutions can get social momentum.84 
We can synchronize our own behaviour to an institution: we do like others do, because ‘that is 
how things are done’. And in doing so, it will continue to be done in the same way ‘by default’.85 
Thus, institutions are autonomous in the sense that they “produce the conditions of their own 
existence”.86 This twofold horizon of institutions also explains how corruption can ‘by itself’ 
seep into an institution apart from any individual intention or accountability. Even if reporters 
act as expected, abiding the law and even morally right, their general news reporting practice 
may corrupt entirely by itself. 
This ‘obscene’ aspect of institutions sets institutional corruption apart from traditional 
corruption concepts. Individual corruption is intentional and is driven by personal benefits. 
Political corruption is characterised as corruption in the public or political realm and may 
involve institutional corruption when a political institutionalized practice has corrupted. It may, 
however, be individual corruption as well, if it involves individual politicians that are 
intentionally bribed for personal benefit. Individual corruption may also be part of institutional 
corruption, which takes place not on a personal, but on a more general, institutional level.  
This section also implies that institutions equally function in the public and private 
spheres. Institutions in both sectors can have profound social consequences for those involved 
and significantly influence society. The private sector should therefore not be exempted from 
critical reflection or judgement to which the public sector is subjected. 
 
 
                                                 
83 See: Luhmann 1995, 484-485. 
84 See: Huntington 1968, 15. 
85 Douglas 1986, 112 
86 Luhmann 1995, 22, 32-33, 44-45.  
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§ 2.3 Modern institutions  
This section sets out what marks a modern institution, what its social importance is and why 
institutional corruption grows preeminent in society. We will see that modern institutions need 
legitimization and that institutions should cultivate solidarity.  
The way we evaluate institutional functioning changed under the heavy influence of 
modernisation, which changes institutions and our moral judgement about them fast and 
profound. Giddens explains that in premodern times, society has been embedded in stable, 
traditional institutions that structured substantial meaning in society.87 Traditional institutions 
had a rather unquestioned authority. One key change of modernity is that we tend to discard 
traditional authorities easier and more often.88 We no longer take the legitimacy of institutions 
as given, but we increasingly and more often ask why particular institutions should have 
legitimacy. We increasingly grow reflective and form an autonomous judgement on 
institutional functioning rather than habitually assume that it is just based on conventional 
authority. There seems to be a shift in public moral judgement from relying on conventional 
authority to a post-conventional, autonomous reasoning. Without conventional authority, 
however, moral judgement about institutional functioning also becomes a bigger challenge if 
we must rely on our own insights to judge autonomously. Thus, we see that modern institutions 
are in continuous demand of legitimation, while our moral judgement on institutional 
functioning becomes more challenging.  
Giddens and Huntington also observe that in modern society we increasingly rely on 
abstract systems or institutions.89 We deal much more with different and anonymous 
individuals, groups, organisations, institutions, and societies – and in a faster pace. We can also 
see that we are compelled to trust each other to hold to some minimal, mutually understood 
expectations as structured into our society – we must trust modern institutions. As Huntington 
notes, we rely more on modern institutions because they must anchor a ‘moral consensus’, 
which is a basic, moral mutual understanding of moral principles and obligations that ensures 
and (can) cultivate solidarity in society.90 
Zijderveld observes that we rely less on conventional authorities and that traditional social 
cores of society are decentring more than ever.91 Institutions become less solid. Instead, network 
relations between institutions and social actors become more important and make our society 
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more flexible. Networks are anonymous, informal, open, and flexible. Institutional boundaries 
become ‘thinner’ and networks of relations become ‘thicker’. Thick institutions would sustain 
more traditional, substantial, and deep meaning and relations. In addition, we see that 
institutional boundaries grow thinner and that institutions anchor less substantial mutual 
understanding in modern society. Nevertheless, we rely more on institutions for anchoring basic 
moral mutual understanding, such as moral principles, which results in that institutional 
legitimacy is put under pressure while our moral judgement about institutional functioning is 
tested. The effect is that when institutional authority is questioned, mutual moral understanding, 
social stability, and solidarity are also put at risk, at least to a degree.92 Giddens remarks that 
our reflective, macro-moral judgement also always invites the risk of institutional disruption.93 
 
§ 2.4 Legitimising institutional pillars  
For institutions to provide a stable social order and cultivate solidarity, they need to be 
legitimated, by which I mean: to gain authority through public acceptance. As Habermas argues, 
the fact that an institution exists and that the institution is somehow legitimised, does not mean 
that the institution is justified.94 We will question the difference between actual institutional 
legitimation and institutional justification; in other words: what might institutional authority 
actually be based on (de facto legitimacy), and what should institutional authority be based on 
(moral legitimation). Some institutional features can contribute to institutional legitimacy. Scott 
distinguishes three legitimating ‘pillars’: regulation, cognition, and normativity.95 To be sure, 
the distinctions between the pillars are practically untenable, as regulation, normativity, and 
cognition add to institutional legitimacy in (some degree of) unison.96 Their distinction here is 
for theoretical purposes only. 
In the regulative pillar, institutions are viewed from a perspective of instrumental 
rationality and regulation. ‘Regulation’ is to be taken broadly, although the focus commonly 
lies on legislation and other sorts of rules. Institutions are characterised by their authority to set 
rules, and control and coerce individuals to comply. The assumption is that institutional 
regulation and compliance are instrumentally-rational, economically expedient, and fit 
individual self-interests.97 Institutions are thought to exist because groups must rationally solve 
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a collective problem and are reproduced as long as they remain useful to that goal. According 
to this pillar, an institution has authority as long as it serves to guide the pursuit of self-interests 
by regulation in a rational manner. The underlying view of this pillar is that a human is a 
rational, self-interested homo economicus. This view is often combined with the social realist 
view that human capacities and interests are naturally endowed rather than socially constructed.  
The logic underlying the cognitive pillar asks whether the behaviour prescribed in this 
situation is considered normal and, therefore, whether we should conform to the institution. 
This happens unconsciously on many occasions, because normality is whatever is ‘taken for 
granted’ and therefore typically unconsciously obeyed. The cognitive pillar is most favoured 
by sociologists.98 Cognitivist neo-institutionalism views institutions as subjectively constructed 
social structures that form objective ‘social facts’, that is, our social world is partly subjectively 
made, but sustained as an objective and shared meaningful worldview – a mutual understanding 
embedded in a shared cultural belief system (lifeworld). Social facts are objective social 
knowledge, which is abstracted from individual cultural beliefs. Institutionalization then, means 
to (re)produce cultural belief systems that individuals ‘take for granted’.99 Cognitive theorists 
generally assume that humans form their social environment and are formed by it, rather than 
having innate capacities. From the cognitive pillar’s perspective, institutional legitimacy lies in 
the mutual understanding that institutions reproduce by themselves. In their cognition, 
individuals consider mutual understanding normal and ‘take it for granted’. Hence, institutions 
are usually not questioned but reproduce our social world as if it were completely natural.  
Scott illustrates the different logics between the regulative and the normative pillars: “the 
logic of instrumentalism [regulative pillar] and the logic of appropriateness [normative pillar] 
helps to clarify the difference between a regulative and a normative conception of institutions. 
An instrumental logic asks, "What are my interests in this situation?" A logic of appropriateness 
asks, "Given my role in this situation, what is expected of me?"”100 According to the normative 
pillar, institutions are (re)produced because appropriate goals are pursued (values) and 
appropriate means are employed (norms).101 The differences with the regulative pillar lie in 
both the underlying view on human nature and its social dimension. The normative pillar 
assumes that humans are reasonable rather than instrumentally rational beings. Furthermore, 
the normative pillar asks how we are expected to behave socially, which can be asked for the 
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sake of being social in its own right, rather than merely out of self-interest. According to this 
pillar, moral force, that is, what is considered ‘appropriate’, legitimizes institutions and lends 
them their authority. Their authority becomes tangible in institutionalized values and norms that 
are enforced as social obligations. This results in an institutional obligation: ‘I should behave 
in accordance to the role I am expected to fulfil, because it resonates with the appropriate norms 
and values’. To be sure, normativity does not only suppress inappropriate behaviour, but also 
enables and empowers individuals to behave differently.102  
However, I think Scott here confuses normality with moral rightness.103 The normative 
logic Scott displays, is based on mere convention and the social expectations flowing from it. 
It is presupposed that whatever behaviour is prescribed – in the form of social agreement or 
otherwise – for an agent with an institutional role, is also justified. When asking what is socially 
expected, we ask whether prescribed action is socially considered normal, not just, however. A 
normative pillar rather demands obedience because the behaviour it prescribes is just. Whereas 
the cognitive pillar asks: ‘how does the institution function?’, the normative pillar asks: ‘how 
ought the institution function?’ The logic of the normative pillar should rather be something 
like: ‘given the situation, do expectations prescribe what I ought to do?’ The normative pillar 
legitimates an institution because the institution prescribes just behaviour and it concerns 
institutional moral legitimacy. How we can know if an institution prescribes morally right 
behaviour, depends on our moral judgement. This is discussed in the next chapter.  
 
§ 2.5 Justification and the institutional pillars 
In this section, we will review how just functioning of an institution relates to the legitimating 
pillars. Let us start with the situation in which all three pillars lend an institution authority. In 
this case, there is simply no question of institutional corruption. An institution is not corrupted 
if it is publicly sanctioned and adheres to regulation (regulatory pillar), is morally right 
(normative pillar) and is publicly taken for granted (cognitive pillar).  
To have cognitive legitimacy, an institution must be – consciously or unconsciously – 
internalised in individual behaviour and be part of our shared lifeworld. If behaviour is not part 
of our lifeworld, that simply means that behaviour has not institutionalised, i.e., there is no 
institution. The cognitive pillar tells us whether behaviour has institutionalised and in what way 
it takes part in our reality. If we actually accepted an institution into our behaviour, then an 
institution has formed, is maintained, and, therefore, has legitimacy. Cognitive legitimacy tells 
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us something is ‘normal’ and, as such, has been institutionalised. We can therefore assume that, 
by definition, all existing institutions have cognitive legitimacy. But as mentioned before, what 
is considered normal is not also just by definition. The cognitive pillar tells whether a practice 
has institutional legitimacy, but not whether it is just. 
Looking at the regulative pillar then, there are several problems. First, while rules may 
help to institutionalise a practice, they do not guarantee institutionalisation. Regulation can, for 
instance, be ignored, be gamed, or fail to institutionalise a practice. Rules are only a means and 
are only instrumentally employed (instrumental rationality). Yet, we note the Lab’s observation 
that institutional corruption can occur even if an institution is legal.104 An institution can be 
legal, but corrupt, as explained earlier in our news example or illustrated by, for instance, 
disproportionate tax evasion as disclosed in the Panama Papers. Obeying regulation or 
instrumental rationality do not tell us whether a practice is appropriate. The regulative pillar 
tells us whether regulation has been followed, aims are achieved, or interests have been served. 
It does not, however, tell us whether institutions are just. 
Let us look at the normative pillar in the light of our example. The reporters are neutral 
and objective on the individual level. Truthful reports about politics are vital to our society. We 
assume that the individual acts of reporting are both truthful and justified. Not only is the 
reporting institution socially expected by society, but it is also legal. Yet taken together as a 
common, general practice, it has the side-effect of presenting a misleading picture of 
politicians. We suppose for the sake of example that the public becomes aware of this 
unintended side-effect. Even though we may accept that the institution of news reporting (must) 
exist(s) and accept the way it functions, nevertheless we may think it actually should not 
function this way. The institution by itself is socially expected, legal, instrumentally rational; 
the individual acts are morally right, we suppose here.105 However, the practice is institutionally 
corrupt for causing an unintended, general side-effect that is harmfully unjust to politicians, 
civilians, and to reporters themselves. In addition, we may lose trust in news reporting once we 
become aware of that side-effect. The institution of reporting is not functioning justly and lacks 
moral legitimacy granted by society. It is, therefore, corrupt.106 
It seems that while every pillar could add to institutional legitimacy107, only the normative 
pillar tells us if an institution is justified and so, whether there is institutional corruption. The 
implications of this observation will be addressed in the next section.  
                                                 
104 Lessig 2013(a), 554. 
105 See footnote 70.  
106 We discuss in the next chapter what ‘injustice’ means in relation to institutional corruption.  
107 See: Li et al. 2007, 331-332, 336. 
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§ 2.6 Institutional trustworthiness and public trust 
As mentioned before, institutional legitimation means that the public accepts institutional 
authority. Public trust in institutions and institutional trustworthiness regarding institutional 
functioning is stressed by many authors.108 This is for good reason, because modern society 
only abides with public trust, in the faith that we and others behave as expected.109 We have a 
minimal moral mutual understanding, expect certain behaviour from each other, and take for 
granted that society continues similar to our expectations. Institutions anchor our moral 
consensus and enable our public trust in them. They exist to support social stability, structure 
moral consensus, and cultivate solidarity. 
Public trust ideally matches institutional trustworthiness, but this is clearly not always the 
case. Public trust in institutions depends on the judgement the public forms about institutions. 
We are only concerned with the question whether institutions are trustworthy. The actual match 
of public judgement with institutional trustworthiness is another matter and depends on aspects 
such as the quality of the public sphere, social or political conditions, or cultural and historical 
forces. We are concerned with public judgement insofar we want to know what makes an 
institution (un)trustworthy and how we (the public) can properly judge the moral functioning 
of an institution. Based on the distinction between public trust and institutional trustworthiness, 
I propose the following preliminary outline of moral distinctions regarding institutional 
functioning: 
o Institutional integrity is when institutions do what they are supposed to do: they function 
just and therefore deserve our trust – they are trustworthy.110 Note that this does not mean 
that the public actually trusts them, but only that the public should trust them. Whether an 
institution has integrity is irrespective of whether the public trusts the institution. For 
instance, this would be the case if the news institution would not produce the harmful side-
effect of a misleading picture of politics. 
o With institutional dysfunction, an institution is trustworthy, but lacks public trust. Note that 
the fault could be with the public for mistakenly distrusting it – not that the institution 
functions unjustly. The institution functions justly and maintains its integrity. Nonetheless, 
if institutions in fact lack public trust, they fail their social task to support social stability 
                                                 
108 See: Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 739. See also: Giddens 1990, 33-37; Luhmann 1995, 127-130. 
109 Giddens 1990, 27; Zijderveld 2000, 73. 
110 Trustworthiness and institutional integrity are not the same. For instance, an institution can be unjust but trustworthy, if the 
public can trust those responsible for the institution to learn from, and address the institutional injustice. I expand on this in 
section 3.6.  
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and/or moral mutual understanding. For instance, the reporting of news may actually ensue 
objectively and neutral, but the public views news as unreliable and misleading. 
o Institutional injustice occurs when an institution is trusted by the public, but functions 
unjust and is therefore untrustworthy. It has sufficient public legitimacy to reproduce itself, 
but fails to function justly. For instance, the news institution unjustly misrepresents 
politicians, but the public thinks news reporting functions justly and correctly. 
o Institutional corruption occurs when institutions function unjustly and are therefore not 
trustworthy, and, for that reason, the public’s trust is also weakened. For instance, the news 
institution commonly produces a misleading picture of politicians, the public knows this 
and for that reason, the public loses trust in news reporting. The institution is viewed as not 
sufficiently ensuring the moral mutual understanding that society expects from it, and thus 
undermines public trust and solidarity.  
Institutional corruption is a combination of losing institutional integrity and 
institutional dysfunction, but only if both concern one and the same aspect. After all, 
different moral distinctions are possible for one institution at the same time. For instance, 
while reporters are financially independent, we mistakenly believe news reporting is paid 
by the government and we distrust news reporting. We then speak of institutional 
dysfunction regarding the aspect of financial dependency. At the same time, news reporting 
is in fact unjust because it is hacked by foreign intelligence services, which spread rumours 
in their interests. At the same time, the public actually, but mistakenly, trusts the institution 
for being hack-proof and objective. In this case, there is institutional injustice in their 
reporting of news. The institution dysfunctions yet maintains integrity in financial 
independency, and functions unjust but is publicly trusted in regarding objective reporting. 
The institution is both dysfunctional and unjust, but it has not corrupted.  
o If an institution changes, but the public trust or the institutional trustworthiness remains 
unchanged, we might simply speak of institutional development. For instance, ‘dry’ news 
reporting gets a new democratic responsibility of maintaining a quality public sphere. 
Meanwhile, reporting remains equally trustworthy and the public actually keeps its trust. 
o If either an institution functions better in moral regard, or if the public trust in the institution 
has justifiably increased, we might speak of institution improvement. For instance, news 
reporting actually is quite trustworthy, but is mistakenly perceived as corrupt by the public. 
The public re-evaluates its own moral judgement, gradually increases its trust and the 
institutional functioning in relation to society improves. 
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These distinctions present us with the following overview. 
 
Scheme 2. Moral distinctions regarding institutional functioning 
 
Institutional trustworthiness 
(integrity) 
No institutional trustworthiness 
(no integrity) 
Public trust - Institutional injustice 
No public trust Institutional dysfunction Institutional corruption 
Improved public trust 
and/or improved 
institutional 
trustworthiness 
Institutional improvement 
 
From this scheme, we firstly observe that the actual functioning of institutions from a moral 
perspective may vary in the everyday from the moral judgement by the public. Secondly, if the 
public judgement can be incorrect, then the public judgement cannot be a right benchmark for 
judging institutional integrity. Whether institutions function justly does not depend on the 
public moral judgement, but on whether they actually take those involved in the institution into 
regard sufficiently. We expand on this more in the next chapter. Thirdly, it appears institutional 
corruption has two sides. One side of institutional corruption is whether institutions are actually 
(un)trustworthy – whether they lost their integrity by being unjust. The other side of institutional 
corruption is public distrust. Fourthly, we see that public moral judgement relates to 
institutional corruption because the public’s trust hinges on its own moral judgement. But only 
in a certain way, that is: only when the public makes a correct moral judgement that an 
institution is untrustworthy, there can be institutional corruption.111 Otherwise, when the 
public’s moral judgement about institutions is incorrect, there is no institutional corruption, but 
dysfunction, injustice, or both. In the following chapter, we research how to properly judge 
institutional trustworthiness. 
 
 
                                                 
111 See: Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 745-747, for the relations between public trust, institutional trustworthiness and 
education. They stress the importance of public moral judgement, see: 2012, 748. 
30 
 
§ 2.7 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we mapped out what makes institutional corruption institutional. Institutions are 
stable social structures that show in our routine behaviour (institutionalized practices). 
Institutions have a twofold character in the sense that they are reproduced through individuals, 
groups, and other institutions, but also reproduce themselves autonomously. This twofold 
aspect shows how institutional corruption differs from traditional concepts of corruption. Their 
twofold character allows that institutional corruption can take place as a practice in a 
structural/patterned mode and on a more general level than the individual level. It explains 
how institutions corrupt while all individual behaviours can be legal, socially expected, and 
even morally right. Unlike individuals and groups, institutions are general routinized practices 
without agency. Therefore, institutions themselves cannot be held accountable for corruption, 
nor responsible for addressing it. This does not mean that some individuals and groups who 
relate to an institution cannot be held responsible under circumstances. However, institutional 
corruption can occur while no individual or group intended it, was aware of it. We also observed 
that the concept of institutional corruption applies to both the public and the private sector, 
because institutions can affect society from a moral perspective regardless of the sector.112  
Furthermore, a brief reflection on modernising tendencies showed that institutional 
legitimacy is put under more pressure, while our moral judgement on institutional functioning 
has become more complicated. It partly explains the growing attention for institutional 
corruption. Institutions should form, structure and cultivate moral mutual understanding (moral 
consensus), social stability and solidarity. Moral consensus, social stability and solidarity are 
imperative to the public trust on which a modern society is built.  
The legitimacy of institution is not the same as justification. With the regulative and 
cognitive pillars alone we cannot conclude on institutional corruption. The normative pillar 
justifies an institution because the institution prescribes just behaviour. We conclude that 
institutional corruption is a gap between how an institution actually functions and how it ought 
to function.  
Institutional corruption concerns social justice. Institutional trustworthiness and public 
trust are two sides of the same coin of institutional moral functioning, both of which are 
evaluated by proper moral judgement about institutional functioning. We distinguished 
institutional integrity, dysfunction, injustice, corruption, development, and improvement. The 
public’s moral judgement relates to institutional corruption insofar public trust hinges on it. 
                                                 
112 Sandoval-Ballesteros explains the urgency of this issue, in: Sandoval-Ballesteros 2013, 8-9, 26-27. 
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Institutions should deserve our trust for being trustworthy. Nevertheless, the public’s moral 
judgement about institutional functioning can be false. The adequacy of public moral judgement 
makes the difference between institutional corruption, dysfunction, and injustice. In the next 
chapter, we ask what makes an institution (un)just and how we can know.  
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3. What is corruptive about institutional corruption? 
 
§ 3.1 Introduction  
The central question in this chapter is: what is corruptive about institutional corruption? This 
question pertains to the questions of: (a) why should we have just institutions and what makes 
an institution corrupt? And: (b) how we can properly judge whether institutions are just? Topic 
(a) is on the moral foundation, and topic (b) asks how we should form a public moral judgement 
about institutional functioning. We investigate what makes an institution corrupt and how we 
can know. 
We start with formulating a moral foundation based on Immanuel Kant’s moral theory. 
We derive a benchmark to judge institutional functioning from that foundation. Then, Jürgen 
Habermas, Lawrence Kohlberg, James Rest, et al. provide a method to adequately evaluate 
institutional corruption. Autonomous moral reason will prove the proper judging method. 
‘Sufficient regard of the moral principles that direct institutional functioning and that pertain to 
all those involved’ will finally prove the benchmark. Kant’s and Habermas’ accounts will be 
guiding. Kant’s account of human dignity proves a plausible and appropriate moral foundation 
within Western moral philosophy.113 Habermas’ discourse theory examines moral judgement, 
which was proved key to institutional corruption in the previous chapter. Also, Habermas’ 
account allows for a broad scope. By contrast, many accounts – such as Rawls’ famous theory 
of justice –  focus on political and/or public institutions only, which I believe is a too narrow 
scope for institutional corruption. Such accounts are therefore too narrow for this research. We 
finish with outlining the implications of this chapter for institutional corruption. 
 
§ 3.2 The moral foundation 
In this section, we ask: what is the moral foundation for just or corrupt institutions? Mead and 
Zijderveld say that institutions should provide social stability and ensure some mutual 
understanding by structuring behaviour. As discussed in the previous chapter, institutions are 
imperative for our practical lives and to form a (shared) identity.114 However, social stability or 
mutual understanding by themselves are not ‘enough’, as unstable societies can have plenty 
mutual understanding and, conversely, stable societies can lack much mutual understanding. 
Likewise, unjust institutions can secure social stability and structure plenty mutual 
                                                 
113 Habermas, 2010. 
114 Zijderveld 2000, 71-73; Douglas 1986, 48-49; Giddens 1990, 34-35; Mead 1934, 75-82, 97, 262. See also: Scott 1995, 41, 
44. 
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understanding too. In this case, unjust practices have normalised into stable institutions that 
support some shared identity. Rather, we also want society to be just and institutions to be just 
so that they deserve our trust, meaning that the institutions are trustworthy. There are many 
reasons imaginable for wanting just institutions, however. They may strategically serve our own 
interests best, or because of tradition, or because other societies and organizations impose it. 
Different reasons refer to different moral foundations. Therefore, we must ask why we ought to 
have just institutions in the first place. The answer gives us the moral foundation and determines 
how our moral judgement of institutions takes form.  
Habermas gives an account of the pivotal role human dignity has acquired as a moral 
foundation throughout Western philosophy.115 Kant is one of the most influential thinkers 
concerning human dignity. He tells us that we are beings that have a dignity because we have 
reason. Something has value for its instrumental use, such as an entertaining news story that 
draws readers and so enables news agencies to make a profit. Instead, reason endows us with 
worth: a dignity, something which cannot be merely instrumentally valued.116 Kant claims that 
dignity lies in our capacity for autonomous reasoning. In short, Kant claims we reason 
autonomously when we (1) think for ourselves and free from external influences, (2) ‘check’ 
our thoughts by thinking from the standpoint of everyone else, and (3) think consistently.117 
Habermas explains that “the Kantian notion of the autonomous will […] means ''accept as 
binding on myself on the basis of my own insight.''”118 If we satisfy this, we think 
autonomously. Our free, autonomous judgement gains its own force in being autonomous and 
thereby performs as a law to ourselves. Autonomous reason can set imperative moral laws for 
ourselves regarding our behaviour.  
Kant’s argument holds that we ought to consider others in our behaviour. It would 
contradict autonomous reason to do otherwise.119 Seeing that others are endowed with reason 
too, we recognize that others have a dignity that we ought to consider the same as ours – others 
are equal from the moral perspective. If others satisfy the same conditions for the recognition 
of dignity as I have, then those should be judged equally. Like we judge ourselves of worth for 
being able to understand, form meaning and decide upon that, those who are similarly receptive 
to that capacity ought to be judged the same. It follows from reason that we treat other 
reasonable individuals not merely instrumentally, but always also as ends in themselves, that 
                                                 
115 Habermas 2010. 466-474. 
116 Kant 2002, 52-53.  
117 O’Neill 1989, 24-27, 47, 83. Kant 2002, 29-30, 37-38, 51.  
118 Habermas 1990(a), 229. Kant 2002, 36-38. 
119 Kant 2002, 50-54. This follows from applying the three principles of autonomous reason. 
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is, to respect the other’s equal dignity. This is derived from Kant’s (second formulation of) the 
categorical imperative. 
Not only do we ought to regard the other’s dignity, we also tend to do so, as sociology 
explains. Mead says that we share a meaningful lifeworld and identities with others by using 
language and the capacity of reflection.120 Continuing in this vein, Habermas observes that 
because we are always situated in a shared lifeworld, we have a need for a common identity – 
for solidarity. Additionally, he observes that justice is ‘reverse side’ of solidarity.121 Habermas 
tells us ‘shared identity’ means that we identify with others insofar we (should) mutually 
recognize the other as free and equal beings who have dignity. I agree with Habermas that we 
must have a moral mutual understanding. 
Such a moral mutual understanding must (ideally) be institutionalized for society to be 
just. Huntington observes that “[m]orality requires trust; trust involves predictability; and 
predictability requires regularized and institutionalized patterns of behavior”.122 It seems to me 
that an institutionalized moral mutual understanding is what Huntington calls a ‘moral 
consensus’.123 Huntington says that moral consensus in complex societies entails an ‘ethical 
bond’ or ‘general principle’ that holds a community together. He adds: “The institutions are the 
behavioral manifestation of the moral consensus and mutual interest.”124 Huntington does not 
elaborate much about what he means by ‘moral consensus’; mainly that institutions 
institutionalize moral consensus. I think Habermas’ account adequately fills this gap.125 
Looking at the accounts of Kant and Habermas, I claim that a minimally institutionalized 
dignity forms that moral consensus. On a society (macro) level, we demand institutions to 
regard all those involved in the institutionalized practice for no other reason than the respect for 
their equal dignity.126 Our trust in each other and institutions to regard those involved, (is likely 
to) support(s) and advance(s) social order and further solidarity.127 The alternative may lead to 
injustice, public distrust, lessened solidarity, and possibly social unrest. From this perspective, 
the Lab’s claims that “undermining the institution’s effectiveness”, including “weakening the 
                                                 
120 Mead 1934, 75-77, 97, 138, 235, 274. 
121 Habermas 1990(a), 243-245. See also: Huntington 1968, 10. 
122 Huntington 1968, 24. 
123 Huntington 1968, 10.  
Theories of (moral) consensus remain controversial. With Habermas, I hold that (moral) consensus is not realistic, but limited 
insofar they are always provisional and possible only in principle. It is something to strive for, while we realistically reach a 
compromise in practice. See: Habermas, 1990(b), 105-106, 205. 
124 Huntington 1968, 10. 
125 See: Habermas 1990(b), 159-160. 
126 Compare Warren’s benchmark of ‘democratic inclusion’, in: Warren 2015, 43-48. Compare also: ‘structural corruption’, in: 
Sandoval-Ballesteros 2013, 23. Both are in my view not incorrect, but fall short for neglecting to explain why social or 
democratic inclusion matters.  
127 See: Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 740. 
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public’s trust or the institution’s inherent trustworthiness” is characteristic for institutional 
corruption, is plainly understandable.128  
Kant would likely endorse Mead’s observation, but from a philosophical perspective.129 
Combining Kant and our sociological observations, we infer that our moral mutual 
understanding includes at least that the recognition and consideration of each other’s dignity 
regarding our behaviour, for no other reason than ‘the other’ himself/herself. We understand 
from this what makes an institution just or corrupt, and why we need just institutions. Our equal 
dignity and solidarity form the moral foundation for institutions and should be institutionalized. 
Institutions should be just, i.e., they must at least guarantee a minimal framework of solidarity 
and the minimal moral understanding that we are free, equal, and have dignity. From the moral 
foundation, we derive the proper benchmark to judge institutional functioning from a moral 
perspective: an institution is just when it sufficiently regards the dignity of all those involved in 
the institution.130 If an institution satisfies this, it has integrity and functions justly. Conversely, 
an institution has corrupted if it insufficiently regards (the dignity of) all those involved in the 
institution and for that reason weakens the public trust. Such institutions are both morally 
wanting and socially dysfunctional. 
 
§ 3.3 Reason as a method 
We have formulated a moral foundation for institutions and derived a moral benchmark for 
institutional functioning from this foundation. Our next step is to ask how we may know how 
to judge whether institutions are just by ensuring sufficient regard for all those involved in the 
institution. We look for a practical method for evaluating institutional corruption. In the 
following sections, we will gradually deconstruct what it means for institutions to sufficiently 
regard all those involved in their practices and how we can know that they really do. 
The prerequisites for institutions to be just (have integrity), are that those involved are 
sufficiently regarded. However, whether institutions are just entirely depends on the situation 
and those involved, and it is different for every instance each. The better we can deconstruct 
institutions and circumstances, the more adequate we can regard those involved in them.131 
Therefore, I think a moral judgement may become more accurate the more advanced our 
                                                 
128 Lessig 2013(a), 553. 
129 Kant 2002, 67-69. He says that judgement (reason) is our capacity to abstract (reflect) and subsume (schematize) our 
experiences of the world. In other words: judging is the same as thinking and using reason we can understand the world, or: 
form meaning. 
130 To be sure, ‘to regard’ does not imply a conscious or intentional deliberation by the institution itself. As discussed in section 
2.2, an institution is a given practice without agency. As such, cannot be a deliberating entity or held responsible by itself.  
131 This claim seems to find support in: Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012, 741-742. 
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capacity for complex reasoning is. Although advanced reasoning capacities do not guarantee 
the quality of moral judgement, it does make quality more likely. My proposal is that 
autonomous moral reason – applied within actual practical discourse (deliberation)132 – is the 
proper method for being the most advanced reasoning, because it most likely takes all those 
involved in an institution into sufficient regard. Therefore, it is most fit to evaluate institutional 
functioning from a moral perspective.133 
Moral development theory can elucidate and supports my proposal that proper moral 
judgement lies in advanced reasoning.134 Cognitive moral development has been researched by 
Lawrence Kohlberg and Rest et al.135 Moral development theory describes and empirically 
verifies different stages of moral reasoning. Kohlberg and Rest et al. suggest that there are three 
levels of cognitive development in reasoning that correlate with moral judgement.136 
Development in moral reasoning implies that moral reasoning takes in prior ways of reasoning 
so that reasoning becomes more complex.137 Additionally, empirical research shows that we 
tend to endorse next levels in moral reasoning as improvements on prior levels, which suggests 
that levels of reasoning are hierarchal and that more complex reasoning is valued more.  
Moral development theory is applied to this research by briefly reviewing commonly used 
moral benchmarks of institutional corruption. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, moral 
development theory on micro level seems to reflect in the macro level as society (the public) 
seems to discard conventional authority for autonomous moral judgement about institutional 
functioning. I think it is insightful to explain a public moral judgement on institutional 
functioning along moral development theory as well. Moreover, Rest et al. argue that cognitive 
moral judgement is suitable for moral judgement as applied to the macro level, including 
institutions.138 Secondly, moral development theory can explain why other benchmarks for 
institutional corruption by themselves involve inadequate ways of reasoning. Thirdly, it 
clarifies how autonomous reason serves our moral judgement about institutions. I will show in 
the following sections that several benchmarks correspond to lower levels of moral reasoning 
and are by themselves inadequate to judge institutional functioning from a moral perspective. 
                                                 
132 See: Habermas 1990(b), 66. 
133 ‘Autonomous reason’ has the Kantian meaning as discussed. 
134 The similar claim is made by Habermas. He explains how moral psychology and moral philosophy reinforce each other, in: 
Habermas 1990(b), 117-119. Kohlberg claims that the task of moral philosophy is to justify empirical findings of moral 
development theory. See: Kohlberg 1973, 633.  
See: Rest et al. 1999(a), for a summary of empirical support of the theory. 
135 Based on cognitive development theory of Jean Piaget, see: Kohlberg 1963.  
136 I only distinguish the three overarching levels because Kohlberg’s stages are controversial. See: Rest et al. 1999(a), 305. 
137 Kohlberg 2000, 599-602; 1973, 632-634; Rest et al. 1999(a), 312-317.  
138 Rest et al. 1999(a), 292. Kohlberg shows his methods also apply to political and social justice questions, in: Kohlberg 2000, 
606-607. 
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Nevertheless, those benchmarks can serve as moral considerations for those involved and weigh 
in on moral judgement about an institution. Eventually, I conclude that only a sound 
consideration – by using autonomous reason within practical discourse – conclusively forms a 
proper moral judgement on institutional functioning. Finally, it is illustrating to observe that 
public seems to reflect a development in moral judgement in consort with modernising 
tendencies, which was already implied in section 2.3. In this perspective, Habermas argues that 
in a modern society with increasing plurality, post-conventional reasoning fits a plural society 
better.139 
 
§ 3.4 Inadequate reasoning 
Along the lines of moral development theory, we discern and review the (public) reasoning of 
different benchmarks for institutional corruption in this section. The first level is the pre-
conventional level.140 What is right, depends on power, or self-interest and instrumental 
rationality. This immediately seems a familiar way of reasoning employed in ‘initial situations’ 
like ‘State of Nature’ as argued by different social contract theorists. Real situations like war 
also come to mind. Here, I interpret ‘power’ as force exercised through an institution and which 
is legitimized socially or legally, such as institutionalized rules or social pressures. However, 
what just is, can clearly not be dependent on power only. It would reduce ‘ought’ to ‘is’. The 
fact that reporters maintain an institution that is accepted by the public, does not imply that the 
institution ought to be the way it is. Even when we abide by an enforced institution, the 
institution can still have unjust consequences to others involved. 
Self-interest and instrumental rationality neither satisfy as benchmarks. Surely, in 
institutionalized practices we can take our self-interests into account and (try to) realize them 
instrumental-rationally, as we do so all the time. Moral considerations do not only concern self-
interests, but also relate to others involved. Morality concerns the social significance of 
behaviour to others involved in it. After all, we are situated in a (life)world shared with others 
in which we not only tend to account for others, but also should. Self-interest is therefore not a 
justifying consideration by itself, although it might weigh in as a moral consideration of 
personal and shared interests. We will return to this later. 
On the conventional level, moral judgement is subject to (social) authority, that is, 
institutions ought to maintain and support the social order and cultivate solidarity, mainly by 
enforcement of rules and social norms. We would match our moral judgement about an 
                                                 
139 Habermas 1990(b), 109.  
140 Kohlberg 2000, 597-599; Rest et al. 1999(a), 304-309. 
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institution with those of authorities such as the state, the law, or authoritative groups or 
individuals. Habermas notes: “On the conventional level, problems of justification and 
problems of application have not yet become separate, because here the substantive morality of 
a traditional milieu has not yet been called into question in a fundamental way.”141 Institutions, 
like traditions and conventions, effectively tell us that a pattern of behaviour is ‘normal’ and 
should be followed for that reason only. We can clearly see that conventional moral judgement 
pertains to the institutional pillars of cognitive and regulative legitimacy. However, 
conventional authorities can also endorse institutions that insufficiently regard those involved. 
The news reporting practice may do wrong to politicians or citizens by unintentionally 
producing misleading pictures. Routine practices, regulation and other institutionalized 
authorities can simply be unjust to those involved.142 Cognitive or regulative legitimation is no 
justification.143 
In this section, we evaluated pre-conventional and conventional reasoning that undergirds 
different kinds of benchmarks. None of them have proved adequate so far. Conventional moral 
judgement appears to match our earlier observations concerning a traditional society. To recall, 
premodern society is generally marked by a bigger significance to unquestioned, traditional 
authority, which accords with conventional moral reasoning. By contrast, a modern society 
increasingly reflects on itself and questions the conventional authority of its own institutions. 
We will see that this accords with post-conventional moral reasoning.144 In the following 
section we will evaluate post-conventional reasoning 
 
§ 3.5 Autonomous reasoning 
Post-conventional reasoning is, according to Kohlberg, marked by the ability to reason from 
principles.145 According to Rest et al., the post-conventional level implies that moral judgement 
should be (1) justifiable, (2) according to moral benchmarks (ideals, values, purposes), (3) that 
pertain to the social relations with others as equals (full reciprocity).146 Because morality 
concerns social relations to others, all others should be able to accept moral ideals. As ideals 
need social justification, it is implied that morality is subject to reasonable critique and it can 
change. Habermas remarks that with post-conventional reasoning substantial moral content 
                                                 
141 Habermas 1990(a), 249. 
142 See for instance: Light 2013, 16. 
143 Habermas 1990(b), 61-62. 
144 See: Habermas 1990(b) 183. 
145 Kohlberg 1973, 632-633, 644. 
146 See: Rest et al. 1999(a), 307-309. 
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from our lifeworld is not conclusive anymore.147 We depart from (traditional) authority other 
than our own reason. Post-conventional reasoning corresponds with the realisation that morality 
concerns questions on how we ought to behave and that we can consider these moral questions 
based on our own insights. Post-conventional reasoning discards the plain acceptance of 
conventional authority. This shift to a post-conventional, autonomous reason seems to reflect 
the development of public moral judgement in the shift from a pre-modern to a modern society 
too.  
However, I think not all forms of post-conventional, autonomous reason are adequate to 
judge institutional functioning. The Lab’s employs an autonomous kind of reasoning, as it does 
not rely on conventional authority but on its own insights. The difficulty with the institutional-
purpose approach of the Lab is that institutional purposes function as core values for institutions 
to strive for. The purpose problem means exactly that anyone can select, apply, and justify 
institutional purposes by themselves. For instance, reporters group A holds the value of 
‘objectivity’ as the main purpose news reporting should serve and uses ‘objectivity’ as a fixed 
benchmark to judge its institutional functioning. Simultaneously, reporters group B maintains 
the institutional purpose of ‘profit’. This demonstrates that institutional purposes can be chosen 
and justified subjectively. The chosen institutional values or purposes can then be used as 
substantial benchmarks for judging the functioning of an institution. I agree with Kohlberg that 
values or institutional purposes by themselves do not bear any moral sense.148 Any ‘bag of 
values’, such as institutional values, is useless, because purposes are subjectively justified and 
are liable to relativism. Furthermore, different institutional purposes are likely liable to conflict 
with each other, be confused with each other, or inept to distinguish institutional development, 
advance, and dysfunction from institutional corruption. We discussed this purpose problem in 
section 1.5. 
The problem of reasoning this way, is that we do not account for the considerations of all 
other groups involved in the institution as viewed from each of their positions. Other groups 
are asked only to consider our reasons as seen from our perspective.149 As Habermas remarks, 
others are only asked if they could follow our reasoning, as a test of whether our reasoning is 
acceptable and therefore reasonable.150 Instead, we should be asking whether others would also 
endorse our reasoning, when viewed from everyone’s perspective each. This involves us taking 
                                                 
147 Habermas 1990(b), 109 
148 Kohlberg 2000, 605. See also: Habermas 1995, 115. 
149 Note that Kant’s categorical imperative is here used to check whether claims are valid and right. See: Kant 2002, 46-47, 52. 
150 Habermas 1990(b), 63-65, 75; 1990(a), 240-245; 1995, 117. Subjective reason takes an Archimedean standpoint. Compare 
with how Kantian theory is apt to employ subjectively: O’Neill’s 1989, 46-47, 81-82, 139; Kant 2002, 41, 57. 
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the perspective of all those involved by forming moral judgement within a practical 
discourse.151 Both forms of reasoning are autonomous insofar they rely on their own insights 
and not on conventional authority. However, the first way of reasoning is subjective, the second 
is moral. Subjective reasoning considers others only in a sense that is too narrow, as it asks of 
others to minimally understand our reasoning and to give their bare approval to it. Only the 
latter reasoning is fit for judging institutional corruption, because only moral reason actually 
forms a moral judgement as it sufficiently considers others. Subjective reason does not 
sufficiently consider the other and does not ask for endorsement. In this light, I am reluctant to 
call subjective reason actual moral reasoning, even if it is autonomously formed.  
Autonomous subjective reasoning also permits the Lab to start from the wrong end by 
taking an institutional purpose – an ideal value – as the starting point, while, as Habermas 
argues, the starting point should rather be the concrete situation in which autonomous moral 
reason is employed.152 If a sufficient regard of all those involved is the benchmark for just 
institutional functioning, we should then identify the actual considerations of all those involved 
in a particular institution within a concrete situation. Autonomous moral reason starts by 
deconstructing the concrete situation, identifying those involved, identifying their 
considerations, and then making a consideration of it all as adequate as possible. As Habermas 
correctly argues, a moral judgement involves a practical discourse to sufficiently take all 
participants and their considerations into account.153 We take the right starting point this way 
and arrive at moral principles at play, entirely based on our own insights and specific to the 
situation. Hence, I think only autonomous moral reason employed within a practical discourse 
can be the proper method to form moral judgement about institutional functioning. 
 
§ 3.6 Implications 
Several implications can be drawn from this chapter. We firstly expand a little more on the 
benchmark of ‘sufficient regard for all those involved’. The extent of this research only allows 
me to skim over the basics. It is recalled that our dignity and solidarity is the moral foundation 
for institutional functioning. Huntington tells us that institutions are required to anchor moral 
consensus in terms of moral principles and obligations.154 Moral principles entail moral minima 
in our moral consensus that hold society together and, therefore, deserve protection. Their 
protection is necessary to maintain and cultivate equal dignity, social stability, and solidarity. 
                                                 
151 See: Habermas 1990(b), 75-76, 121-126, 159-163. 
152 Habermas 1990(b), 103-104; 1995, 117-118. 
153 Habermas 1990(b), 66-68, 75-76, 159-163. 
154 Huntington 1968, 10. 
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It implies that institutions ought to function justly by sufficiently regarding the moral principles 
that direct its functioning, and that pertain to all those involved. Which moral principles are at 
play, entirely depends on the situation. Hence, we could say that if moral principles are violated 
by an institution, we could speak of institutional corruption. Whether moral principles are at 
play and whether they are violated, can be investigated by applying autonomous reason within 
a practical discourse. We can, thus, adequately analyse a concrete situation and identify moral 
considerations. Whether institutional corruption really occurs by the violation of moral 
principles entirely depends on the situation. In some cases, institutions cannot avoid violating 
certain moral principles, for instance, when moral principles conflict with other principles. In 
such cases, those involved may still be sufficiently regarded, even though certain moral 
principles are unavoidably violated.  
Furthermore, moral principles can be distinguished from other considerations that do not 
touch upon moral minima, such as furthering interests. Other interests that do not violate moral 
principles rather thwart an advantage and will unlikely amount to institutional corruption. 
Hence, moral principles trump interests as a rule. Exceptions to this rule are well conceivable. 
Also, different kind of considerations are well conceivable too. This distinction serves as an 
initial suggestion. 
The corruption of an institution lies in that the institution insufficiently regards the moral 
principles that pertain to those involved, which causes the public to lose its trust. So, 
institutional corruption is the weakening of institutional trustworthiness (institutional integrity) 
and, for that reason, also a weakening of the public’s trust. The loss of institutional integrity 
means that the moral principles that direct institutional functioning and that pertain to all those 
involved in the institution, are insufficiently regarded. A weakening of public trust has the effect 
that social stability and/or solidarity is (at risk of being) weakened.  
To put this in perspective, let us consider our exemplary case in a (very) brief exposition. 
It should be stressed here that an actual moral case requires much more investigation and 
discussion. Also, for reasons discussed above, it should be attempted to make these kinds of 
moral investigations within a practical discourse. We start not by defining an institutional 
purpose, but by deconstructing the situation. The institution of news reporting unintentionally 
has the side-effect of creating a misleading picture of politicians and the public is aware that 
reporting causes this unintended side-effect. Among ‘those involved’ we can count many 
parties, such as news reporters, news readers, politicians, citizens, businesses, lobbyists, et 
cetera. Their particular considerations regarding reporting are manifold as well. News reporters 
may have considerations like sincerely serving general interests, making a profit, or voicing 
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their opinions. Perhaps politicians want to make a good public appearance, communicate with 
voters, or get informed themselves. Business organisations may want to make a good public 
appearance too, or extend business opportunities to reporters. Citizens may want news for the 
sake of being well-informed, for political and social engagement, or entertainment.  
We divide such considerations into considerations that touch on moral principles or 
considerations that further interests. We identify the relevant moral principles and interests that 
embed this particular situation, using our own insights. For instance, reporters have an interest 
in making profit (furthering an advantage) and a right to voice their opinion (minimal moral 
principle of freedom). Businesses have economic interests in business opportunities with 
reporters. Politicians have a political interest to appear positive to the public and may justly 
claim from reporters that they make an effort to prevent misleading portrayals, lest moral 
principles like proper democratic representation and due public trust in politics is violated. 
Citizens have a personal interest to be entertained and may also have a (moral) right towards 
reporters to help sustain the quality of the public sphere, lest moral principles like a minimal 
meaningful democratic participation and deserved trust in politicians is violated. We see that 
moral principles are not chosen beforehand as institutional purposes, but are identified as actual 
considerations within a concrete situation.  
In this case, the institution of reporting is unjust to those involved, as it harms citizens 
and politicians. The harm lies in that the institution violates moral principles that are at play in 
this particular situation (democratic representation, public trust, democratic engagement). Other 
considerations (mentioned interests) do not seem to weigh up in this instance. If the public trust 
in news reporting has weakened because this institutional injustice, we would correctly judge 
that the institution of news reporting has corrupted by generating misleading pictures. 
A second implication is that using autonomous reason to sufficiently regard others, 
implies a bottom-up approach, which means that we are required to deconstruct the concrete 
circumstances within a practical discourse.155 Every moral judgement concerning institutional 
functioning is always entirely situational and every institution must be judged individually.156 
It also implies a top-down approach, insofar other elements and benchmarks, such as norms, 
rules, social expectations, authority, and purposes, can weigh in regarding moral judgement on 
institutions. As explained before, benchmarks such as institutional purposes are arrived at, 
rather than starting with them and using them as a pre-established, fixed benchmark.  
                                                 
155 Rest et al. 1999(b) 25-26. 
156 Compare: Habermas 1990(b), 30-32, 83-86, 178-179. Fields does a similar, but deficient suggestion, in: Fields 2013, 15. 
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Thirdly, autonomous moral reason implies that considerations are always apt for revision, 
as circumstances may change, groups may become involved or uninvolved, and/or reasons may 
appear, change, or disappear, which effects the moral dimension of institutional functioning. 
Our judgement must continuously be adjusted and improved. Hence, our moral judgement on 
institutional corruption is provisional.157  
This provisional element relates to the fourth implication: moral judgement on 
institutional corruption is a joint moral learning process that (ideally) takes place within a 
practical (public) discourse. This learning process has already been remarked by Habermas.158 
Moral judgement based on autonomous moral reasoning is a joint affair, as all those involved 
are equal participants in practical discourse about institutional functioning, due to their equal 
dignity and capacity for autonomous reason.159 Practical discourse is most likely to make moral 
judgement more adequate by actually involving all those involved into the actual consideration, 
rather than using autonomous subjective reason. The joint affair may improve critical force and, 
according to Habermas, is the proper way to justify moral judgement.160 Practical discourse can 
strengthen the autonomy and objectivity of moral judgement. Therefore, public moral 
judgement concerning institutional corruption is and should be a joint affair.161 The joint efforts 
and results of the Lab give a good example. 
We observe the importance of a joint moral learning process with the following 
reflection.162 If a moral learning process is implemented by those agents who are (held) 
responsible to redress a corrupted institution, then the learning process can make the institution 
trustworthy again. A moral learning process allows errors by those responsible while the public 
saves its trust. Making mistakes may be part of learning and improvement. For instance, if 
reporters make a sincere and (minimal) effective effort to address the institutional injustice of 
misportrayal, the public may trust reporters to redress the institution, even if reporters make 
some further mistakes and it takes time to redress the corruption. If public trust is restored or 
has not weakened, then there is no institutional corruption, but at most (some) institutional 
injustice – and improvement! 
If the responsible agents refuse to learn from the institutional dysfunction, the institution 
is untrustworthy. For instance, if reporters refuse to try to prevent generating misleading 
images, we are justified to lessen our trust in reporting and so institutional corruption enters. 
                                                 
157 See: Habermas 1990(b), 91-92, 97.  
158 Habermas 1990(b), 125-126. 
159 Habermas 1990(a), 227.  
160 Habermas 1990(a), 235-236. See also: Habermas 1990(b), 36-37, 71, 97-98, 161-163; O’Neill 1989, 41-43. 
161 See: Habermas 1990(b), 68; 1995, 124. See also: Rest et al. 1999(b).  
162 See for the importance of education on public trust: Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012. 
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Alternatively, the public may not recognize the learning process, even though reporters really 
do learn and improve the institution; then institutional dysfunction occurs. Reporters may 
actually be trustworthy for making a sincere and minimally effective effort, yet are mistakenly 
distrusted by the public.  
The foregoing shows that the implementation and public recognition of a moral learning 
process in the fight against institutional corruption crucially affects both institutional 
trustworthiness and public trust. It can make the difference between institutional integrity, 
dysfunction or corruption. 
  
§ 3.7 Conclusion 
To gain an overview, our conclusions are set out concisely and point by point.  
o Institutions must be just due to our individual equal dignity, and solidarity. This is the 
moral foundation for our society and our institutions. Power, self-interest, rules, social 
norms, routines, habits, and other elements of the regulatory or cognitive pillars are by 
themselves no adequate benchmarks.  
o Equal dignity and solidarity require that institutions ensure sufficient regard for the moral 
principles that direct their functioning and that pertain of all those involved in the 
institution. ‘Sufficient regard for the moral principles that direct institutional functioning, 
and that pertain to all those involved in the institution’ is the benchmark. If that is satisfied, 
an institution maintains integrity.  
o Institutional corruption means that the moral principles that direct its functioning and that 
pertain to all those involved in an institutional practice are insufficiently ensured; and that, 
for that reason, the public trust is also weakened.  
o Neither pre-conventional nor conventional reasoning suffice for public moral judgement 
on institutions. Regarding post-conventional reasoning, autonomous subjective reason as 
employed by the Lab is inadequate too. Only an autonomous moral reason that sufficiently 
regards others is adequate. Only autonomous moral reason is the proper method for 
morally judging institutions, because only that takes all others sufficiently into regard 
based on its own insights.  
o To have sufficient regard for all those involved we furthermore explicated in terms of moral 
principles that make up our moral consensus and hold society together. They therefore 
deserve protection. Moral principles trump interests as a rule, as protection of moral 
minima trump furthering advantages.  
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o Public moral judgement on institutional functioning is furthermore marked as situational, 
provisional, and as a joint moral learning process. 
o Finally, I claim that those involved in an institution have a right to institutional integrity. 
This entails the right to the prevention and addressing of institutional corruption. Reversely, 
this implies an obligation for those responsible to make a minimal effort. Those involved 
then have a duty to trust when institutions are trustworthy and trust is due.  
 
Our conclusions are presented in the following final overview. 
 
Scheme 3. Overview of corruptions 
Traditional corruption 
Institutional corruption 
(Thompson-Lessig model) 
Institutional corruption 
(My model) 
(Moral consequence) 
Individual’s integrity is 
harmed 
 
 
 
(Moral consequence) 
(a) Weakens public trust 
(b) Institutional practice is 
illegitimate 
(c) Weakens institutional 
effectiveness to reach 
(d) A purpose 
(Moral consequence) 
(a) Insufficiently regards 
(b) The moral principles that direct 
its functioning 
(c) And pertain to all those 
involved 
(d) And for that reason 
(e) The public’s trust is also 
weakened  
Quid pro quo exchange of 
improper public service 
(individual intention) 
Economy of influences in self-
perpetuation 
(institutional tendency) 
Autonomous reproduction of a 
behavioural practice 
(institutional tendency) 
Personal benefit for 
individual(s) 
Institutional advantage No advantages required 
Individual moral 
blameworthiness 
Institutions are incapable of moral 
blame 
Institutions are incapable of moral 
blame 
(Often) illegal (Often) legal Legal or illegal 
(Often) public sector (Often) public sector Private and public sector 
 
 
  
46 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this research, I posed the question: what is the moral foundation of institutional corruption? 
I prompted this question because institutional corruption has become an urgent issue with 
potentially severe effects on societies. Institutional untrustworthiness and public distrust risks 
jeopardizing moral consensus, social stability, and solidarity.  
One major difficulty is that institutional corruption is a rather underdetermined concept, 
particularly concerning its moral foundation. Common versions rely too much on concepts of 
traditional (political) corruption. The main risk is that the concept inflates into an all-purpose 
word. Moreover, conceptual misunderstandings may lead to inadequate institutional reforms 
that may do more harm than good. Different thinking and action is needed. This research 
attempted to shed a light on the peculiarities of institutional corruption and to spell out the moral 
consequences of its peculiarities.  
 
The question in the first chapter was: what is institutional corruption? I first distinguished 
institutional corruption from traditional corruption concepts. Next, I reviewed the main findings 
of the Lab on the moral foundation of institutional corruption. The Lab’s leading view is the 
Thompson-Lessig model, in which the moral rightness of institutions is judged by institutional 
purposes. However, the institutional-purpose approach leads to the problems of confused, 
conflicting, changed, or confounded purposes. In addition, the private sector tends to be 
excluded while it should be included. Fiduciary theory nor functionalism can redeem the 
purpose problem or the private-sector problem adequately. I concluded that the institutional 
purpose approach only tells us whether a purpose is reached, not whether an institution 
functions just. Not only is the purpose approach an inadequate benchmark, it also applies a 
wrong method, as it starts by applying a purpose ‘from outside’ to an institution, which can be 
subjectively justified.  
In the second chapter the following question was raised: what is institutional about 
institutional corruption? This question was driven by the confusion of the Lab (among others) 
about what characterises institutions. Institutions are no groups of people, organiations or 
institutes, but stable social structures in the form of routinized behaviour (practices). Institutions 
enable us to understand ourselves, others, our shared social lifeworld, and the world as a whole. 
In modern society, institutions (should) support and cultivate social stability and solidarity. A 
characteristic of institutions is that they have a twofold horizon with individual and social 
(shared) dimensions. The institutions’ two-fold character explains how autonomous 
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reproduction can cause institutions to corrupt while individuals act legal, morally right and as 
(socially) expected. Institutions have no agency and cannot be held accountable for institutional 
corruption. Depending on the situation, individuals and groups (agents) may be held 
responsible. 
Modern society tends to discard conventional authority for an autonomous and critical 
moral judgement. As a result, society continuously demands legitimation from its institutions. 
Nevertheless, modern society compels us to increasingly rely on institutions to anchor a vital 
moral consensus in terms of moral principles and corresponding obligations. Lastly, traditional, 
thick institutions are changing into modern, thinner networks. The result is that institutional 
legitimacy is put under pressure while our moral judgement about institutional functioning is 
challenged. This partly explains why institutional corruption receives attention today and brings 
insight regarding public moral judgement about institutional functioning. 
To some degree, institutions are taken for granted, regulated, and/or socially enforced. 
However, de facto, social legitimation does not entail institutions’ justification (moral 
legitimation). The regulative and cognitive institutional pillars of institutions by themselves do 
not say anything about institutional corruption. The normative pillar legitimates an institution 
for prescribing just behaviour. Institutional corruption is a gap between actual institutional 
functioning and how it ought to function. Institutional trustworthiness and public trust are two 
sides of the same coin of institutional functioning. Institutions must deserve our trust for being 
trustworthy. We distinguished institutional corruption from institutional integrity, dysfunction, 
injustice, development and improvement. Public moral judgement relates to institutional 
corruption because public trust hinges on it. But public judgement can be false and, hence, it is 
no proper benchmark for moral judgement. A sound public moral judgement makes the 
difference between institutional corruption, dysfunction, and injustice.  
In the third chapter, the question was what is corruptive about institutional corruption. 
For that purpose, I researched the moral foundation for institutional corruption. The benchmark 
I derived from the moral foundation undergirds moral judgement concerning institutional 
functioning. I proposed a moral foundation for institutional corruption based on the Kantian 
tradition of free, equal dignity and the Habermassian solidarity. Both require an institutionalized 
moral consensus of moral principles. The benchmark for institutional functioning is that all 
those involved in an institution are sufficiently regarded by it. 
I reviewed reasoning underlying different benchmarks of institutional corruption along 
the lines of moral development theory. The pre-conventional and the conventional levels of 
moral judgement fall short. This implies that (different kinds of) power, (self-)interests, norms, 
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regulation, and conventional social authorities per se are ruled out as satisfying moral 
benchmarks. Only a post-conventional, autonomous reason will do. However, autonomous 
reason can be employed subjectively in moral judgement on institutional functioning. The Lab 
takes this approach which results in a deficient institutional purpose benchmark. This approach 
starts at the wrong end and it insufficiently takes others into account, so that it is not a moral 
judgement. Instead, autonomous moral reason compels us to take the role of all involved and 
to take all into consideration within a practical discourse, based on own insights.  
I further elucidated that ‘sufficient regard for all those involved’ is understood in terms 
of moral principles. They protect moral minima and, therefore, deserve protection. Also, they 
trump interests, which further advantages for all those involved. Moral principles are always 
extracted from the concrete situation. It also implies that autonomous moral reasoning is 
situational, provisional, and involves a joint moral learning process. The latter can make the 
difference between institutional dysfunction, corruption or injustice.  
I conclude that institutional corruption occurs when an institution insufficiently regards 
the moral principles that direct its functioning and that pertain to all those involved, and for 
that reason the public’s trust is also weakened. 
 
My account of institutional corruption has several advantages.  
1. It takes better account of the peculiar character of institutions than most current theories on 
institutional corruption and it offers a more adequate approach on the moral consequences.  
2. It avoids the subjective approach of moral judgement that leads to the institutional purpose 
problem.  
3. It allows versatile practical use by starting with a concrete situation, using autonomous 
judgement within practical discourse and a practical categorisation of the actual 
considerations.  
4. My practical approach allows for application to both the public and the private sector. Not 
only public institutions, but private institutions can also be morally judged on their 
functioning. For instance, my approach allows us to morally evaluate private off-shoring 
of monies, climate-harming practices, or social traditions like caste-system societies.  
5. My account can properly distinguish between institutional moral functioning in terms of 
institutional development, improvement, dysfunctioning, injustice or corruption.  
6. It includes a moral learning process that may improve public moral judgement and helps 
in the fight against institutional corruption. It also emphasizes the importance of adequate 
education and public moral judgement. 
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The significance of institutional corruption and social urgency for addressing it, is plain. This 
research is limited in scope and can be expanded on much more. I think the following aspects 
are among the most important. Firstly, differences between institutional corruption and 
traditional (political) corruption requires further exploration. Institutional corruption is too 
often equated with traditional (political) corruption. The roles of institutional trustworthiness 
and public trust for a just society also deserve much more attention. Secondly, we urgently need 
improved measures against institutional corruption. This means primarily exploring other 
methods than usual repressive methods of regulation, monitoring, and sanctioning.163 Thirdly, 
we need more reflection on the interaction between individuals and institutions. What an 
institution really is, tends to be overlooked.164 This issue pairs with the many social and 
institutional changes which currently take place.165 All these issues require at least more 
interchange between fields of expertise, among which philosophy, sociology, and psychology. 
 
I close off to repeat the claim that a (moral) right to institutional integrity exists for all those 
involved in the institution. It entails a duty to make an effort to maintain institutional integrity 
– to prevent and fight institutional, dysfunction, injustice, or corruption. Similarly, citizens have 
a duty to trust institutions when institutions are trustworthy.   
                                                 
163 See: Li et al. 2007, 335-336. 
164 See: Fields 2013. 
165 See: Sandoval-Ballesteros 2013; Zijderveld 2000, 178-179. 
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